CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION, ENGAGEMENT, AND DISSENT, 2008-2016 by Reminiskey, Edward I.C.
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations Office of Graduate Studies 
6-2019 
CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICS OF 
INTEGRATION, ENGAGEMENT, AND DISSENT, 2008-2016 
Edward I.C. Reminiskey 
California State University - San Bernardino, ereminiskey@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd 
 Part of the European History Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Political History 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reminiskey, Edward I.C., "CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION, 
ENGAGEMENT, AND DISSENT, 2008-2016" (2019). Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations. 807. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/807 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION, 
ENGAGEMENT, AND DISSENT, 2008-2016 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Faculty of 
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
in 
Social Sciences and Globalization 
 
 
by 
Edward I.C. Reminiskey 
June 2019 
CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION, 
ENGAGEMENT, AND DISSENT, 2008-2016 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Faculty of 
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
by 
Edward I.C. Reminiskey 
June 2019 
Approved by: 
 
Timothy Pytell, PhD, Committee Chair, History 
 
Brian Janiskee, PhD, Committee Member, Political Science 
 
 
© 2019 Edward I.C. Reminiskey 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comprehensive interpretation of European political history 
in the periodization from 2008 to 2016. The history begins with an exploration of 
the intellectual and political origins of the post-World War II project of European 
integration and the development of, and opposition to, the early institutions that 
eventually formed the contemporary assemblage of the European Union. 
Following a traditionally structured history, this work is styled as a ‘history of the 
present’ that specifies the role of the European Union in precipitating and 
attempting to overcome the financial and monetary crises, foreign policy 
quandaries on its Eastern periphery, an unmanageable escalation in migration 
rates, and the materialization of Eurosceptic, populist, and anti-establishment 
political actors at European and national levels. The specific arrangement of this 
thesis intends to fulfill its ultimate purpose of identifying the dynamic 
circumstances that aided the outcome of the United Kingdom referendum to 
leave the European Union. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE CONVERGENCE OF POSTWAR EUROPE 
The war that came to an end in 1945 was the costliest war in human 
history and dwarfed all previous military engagements. World War II took millions 
of lives and destroyed much of Europe’s civilian infrastructure in less than six 
years – it was mostly a war of occupation; a civilian experience.1 Despite the 
massive losses and widespread destruction, the war rearranged and transformed 
the international political order. Loosely speaking, the war represented an 
ideological battle between liberalism, communism, and fascism. The fascist 
element was buried at the end of World War II and seemingly overnight a hostile 
nuclear standoff developed between liberalism and communism, or the United 
States and Soviet Union. Thus, the year 1945 is only a relative watershed 
moment.2 While half of Europe enjoyed a recovery unparalleled in human history, 
the other continued to suffer in the psychological, political, and economic chains 
of Soviet communism. 
What was to come of Europe after the war? Nazi Germany and their 
collaborators wiped the European continent clean of the weak governments and 
political systems that existed in the interwar years. While World War I only had 
the significant consequence of ridding Europe of old dynastic empires, World 
                                                 
1. Estimating the amount of lives lost is a difficult task due to the sheer scale of the conflict. Every 
major world power was involved, including their colonies and overseas possessions. In Postwar: 
A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt gave the estimate for Europeans alone at 36.5 million 
lives, a “staggering” number as he stated it, even if conservative. 
2. Tony Judt, "Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era?" Daedalus 123, no. 3 
(1994): 1-19. 
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War II and its aftermath directly displaced and reorganized entire populations of 
differing peoples.3 Soviet ‘resettlement’ of the quite large German population 
outside of Germany was particularly the most brutal. The end of the war assisted 
in the implementation of the borders and nations that exist in the present day. 
The Allied occupation of Germany positioned itself as the most substantial 
issue after the war and the most symbolic location of ground zero for the Cold 
War. Originally intended to suppress any attempt to reignite the war and to 
facilitate the process of denazification, the occupation became a point of 
contention not just between the occupiers and their respective zones but 
between the occupiers themselves – the United States, Britain, France, and 
Soviet Union. In what has been articulated first by German poet Hans Magnus 
Enzenberger and repeated later by British historian Tony Judt, a “collective 
amnesia” swept Europe.4 It was obvious for the major powers that the new 
geopolitical situation was going to be a fight for influence in Central Europe. As 
1945 drifted further away, the reconstruction and influence in Europe took priority 
over any repercussions for wartime grievances. 
The most significant political figure in Germany of the postwar years was 
Konrad Adenauer, a former mayor of Cologne who was imprisoned several times 
during Nazi regime and after the war held a contemptuous attitude toward the 
continued occupation of Germany. He founded the Christian Democratic Union, a 
                                                 
3. Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
92-130. 
4. Judt, Postwar, 60-61. 
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political party that aimed to rebuild German politics after the war and restore 
German sovereignty. By 1949, the Allied forces in the Western portion of 
Germany (Americans, British, and French) had all withdrawn from their zones in 
Germany except for the French protectorate in the Saar region.5 Adenauer saw 
that the path toward shedding the Nazi label for the newly established Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) was cooperation and involvement in the 
international arena. Balance of power defined the continent for centuries, 
especially between France and Germany. Thus, from the perspective of 
Adenauer, there was nothing to lose and everything to gain from fostering 
positive relations with France and other European nations. Early in the postwar 
years, Adenauer understood the need for a Franco-German rendezvous to 
oppose the control of outside influencers. 
Toward A Unified Europe 
The concept of a unified continent is not unique to postwar Europe. 
Empires have had their generous share of European history, first with the 
incredible full extent of the Mediterranean society built by the Roman Empire in 
late antiquity. The spread of Christianity by the Romans is noteworthy in and of 
itself in subsequently unifying the peoples of Europe for hundreds of years, albeit 
the with repeated schisms into religious denominations and holy domains. 
Potentially the most ignored example among historians of European integration is 
                                                 
5. The Saar protectorate was ceded to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957. 
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the ambiguous Holy Roman Empire. Its system of imperial governance made it 
distinct from the rest of Europe. It bound itself together using a flexible legal 
structure and ‘progressive fragmentation’ of its complex hierarchy. Most 
importantly, the Empire was in part responsible for building the modern 
conception of Westphalian sovereignty.6 It is no accident that a political invention 
like sovereignty emerged from the Thirty Years’ War, the bloodiest armed conflict 
of the medieval era comparable to the two World Wars.7 French general and 
statesman Charles de Gaulle himself referred to the 20th century skirmishes with 
the Germans as a second thirty-years’ war, of course in his strict adherence to 
nationalist language (and at the same time participating in collective amnesia by 
failing to mention the existence of Vichy collaborators):  
The tragedy of the thirty-year war, which we have just won, has involved 
many adventures and saw many actors come and go. We French are 
among those who always remained on the stage and never changed 
sides. Circumstances may have compelled us to vary our tactics, 
sometimes in the light of the battlefields, sometimes in the night of the 
clandestine. But we only have one kind of veteran. Those of us who, in the 
past, attacked the Marne, the Yser, or the Vardar, differed in no wise from 
those who, yesterday, clung to the Somme, bent on Bir-Hakeim, took 
Rome, defended the Vercors or liberated Alsace. The painful victims of the 
martyred villages of the valley of Saulx fell for the same cause as the 
glorious soldiers buried at Douaumont. What would have been the 
character and outcome of this war if, from the first to the last day, she had 
been French at the same time as worldly? What would peace be tomorrow 
if it were not to be the peace of France as well as that of others?8 
 
                                                 
6. Peter H. Wilson. "The First European Union," History Today 66, no. 4 (2016): 10-19. 
7. See this perspective on World War I and II in Michael Howard’s “A Thirty Years’ War?” and Ian 
Kershaw’s “Europe’s Second Thirty Years War.” 
8. Charles de Gaulle, Speech at Bar-le-Duc, 28 July 1946, Digithèque de Matériaux Juridiques et 
Politiques, University of Perpignan. 
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De Gaulle’s resentment toward the Germans defined most of that speech. Not 
long after the war, de Gaulle’s sentiments were never fully realized in postwar 
politics, but he will surface as a key figure in restraining the lofty goals of the 
European project in the 1960s. Nevertheless, European affairs (in the West, at 
the very least) differed significantly from the past in that building the economy 
took priority over punishing the losers of war. The French found it more important 
to revive its industries and remain as a key player in postwar international affairs 
– which also happened to interact with the postwar goals of the Germans. The 
Americans, in conjunction with the British, desired to maintain a strong and 
economically prosperous Western Europe backed by the safety guarantees of 
NATO.  
One modern-day conception of European integration came immediately 
after World War I by means of the Paneuropean Union association. Established 
in 1923 and led by its President, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, its stated goal 
was to advocate for a liberal and democratic European state. The loose 
association of intellectuals, artists, and other public figures of the time gave 
support for this idealist vision during the interwar years. These sentiments were 
written in Kalergi’s manifesto, aptly titled Pan-Europe.9 This movement was 
temporarily stalled by the rise of Hitler and Stalin, and as the continent focused 
more on the economic turmoil caused by the Great Depression. Hitler banned the 
organization in Germany and most intellectuals dropped their support in favor of 
                                                 
9. Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926). 
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the Soviet Union. While this organization held a minor status after World War II, 
many of its vague, primitive concepts were incorporated into the foundation of the 
Council of Europe in 1949.10 
European associations advocating for unity, or at the very least against 
war, came and went in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, the most noteworthy of these came in Mussolini’s Italy with the 
founding of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE, translated as European 
Federalist Movement) by Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colormi. 
The historically interesting Ventotene Manifesto, named after the prison island 
they were being held for political reasons, was crudely drafted in 1941 by these 
three men.11 After the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943, they were released and 
continued their federalist activism within the ranks of the Resistenza. Rossi and 
Colormi were killed by the Nazis in 1944, leaving Spinelli to be the most 
prominent federalist voice remaining from the group. Spinelli worked as a 
campaigner for European federalism after World War II, often interacting with 
Democrazia Cristiana (DC, translated as Christian Democracy) led by Alcide de 
Gasperi.12 Spinelli, a former communist, believed that only integration of 
                                                 
10. The present-day organization has a website with information on their history and present-day 
activities. Last accessed December 20, 2018 at: http://www.international-paneuropean-union.eu 
11. Charles F. Delzell, "The European Federalist Movement in Italy: First Phase, 1918-1947," 
Journal of Modern History 32, no. 3 (1960): 243. 
12. Many of the founders and advocates of European integration among the likes of de Gasperi 
and Adenauer were Christian Democrats. This group of political parties that emerged after World 
War II reconciled differences between Catholics and Protestants as well as ideological 
differences between the left and right. Christian Democrats were responsible for establishing 
prosperous social market economies in postwar Europe. 
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European defense and the economy in a federal structure would be able to stave 
off the intrusion of Stalin and his communist allies. While the spirit of his ideas 
was incorporated into the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC), his desires of full-fledged 
federalism, including defense and political communities and common currency, 
would not be realized in his lifetime. 
These movements were not powerful in the sense that they had a huge 
hand in the actual execution of integration – they were only idealists at best. 
While their ideas did not fall on deaf ears, the trajectory of European integration 
was completely open-ended for much of the twentieth century. There was 
certainly a sense of urgency to do something to take control of European affairs, 
but in the end it never fully realized itself and the noticeable impacts were 
insignificant. However, in broader terms the end of World War II signaled the 
beginning of a renaissance of international affairs; a permanent fixation on 
striving for international dialogue that had failed during the interwar period. It was 
under these conditions that the Frenchmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman 
were able to make an effective case to establish the ECSC. 
Building the Community and Early Eurosceptics 
Arguably the most influential document on European integration 
transmitted in the postwar years was the Schuman Declaration, written jointly by 
French foreign minister Robert Schuman and political advisor Jean Monnet. It 
was finalized on 9 May 1950 and was presented to the Council of Europe later 
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that year. It called for the formation of a “cartel” that controlled coal and steel 
industries between France, Germany, and other members under a supranational 
“High Authority.”13 The integration of these industries directly removed the 
incentives for Germany and France to outproduce one another and compete the 
manner prevalent throughout the prewar years. Schuman and Monnet stated 
their desire to finally resolve Franco-German militarism: 
The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of 
the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in 
the first place concern these two countries.14 
 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) emerged as the first 
step of European integration. The ECSC consisted of France, Germany, Italy, 
and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It was a key 
moment, but only symbolic and is dwarfed in comparison to the scope and size of 
the European Union that exists in the twenty-first century. However, the wish of 
the idealists of the time was that integration in one area would eventually need to 
spill over into other areas.15 Then came the proposed European Defence 
Community (EDC), an attempt to integrate militaries in the same way coal and 
steel were regulated under the ECSC. However, this was very much at odds with 
the mission of NATO and the enormous influence of the United States and 
United Kingdom in European defense – a fact that sustains until the present day. 
Subsequently, the EDC failed to materialize when the treaty was rejected by 
                                                 
13. Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, European Union.  
14. Schuman and Monnet, Schuman Declaration, 1950. 
15. See spillover in Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (London: Stevens, 1958). 
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France, who at the time was still attempting to hold onto its overseas empire, 
keep its republic intact, and keep the FRG in check. Thus, in 1957 the original six 
gathered once again to establish the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The EEC was the vehicle for integration, not integration in and of itself. While the 
EEC did establish a customs union and common market, it only proposed the 
development of policy specifics. Herein lies the major problem for integration for 
decades to come: nation-states and their own interests conflicting with each 
other on top of their battle with technocrats and their schemes. 
A common portrayal for the origins of Euroscepticism is that it began with 
Margaret Thatcher, which will be included later in this chapter. However, it is 
reasonable to suggest that Euroscepticism began before the time of Thatcher via 
Charles de Gaulle during his tenure as President of France in the 1960s. De 
Gaulle continuously ran against the supranational goals of the EEC, an institution 
in which he had very little involvement in its establishment. The 1966 ‘empty 
chair’ quandary and the subsequent concessions given to de Gaulle are 
exemplary of his mission to rein in the powers of the European institutions and 
assert French interests. De Gaulle rejected, once in 1963 and again in 1967, the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC on the grounds that they were 
incompatible with the continental economy: 
England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her 
exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often 
the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and 
10 
 
commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her 
doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.16 
 
De Gaulle believed that by bringing the United Kingdom into the EEC, it 
would create an imbalance too large to correct, especially in the sensitive and 
contentiously settled Common Agricultural Policy. Also key in his opposition was 
his skepticism of the Atlanticism between the UK and the United States – a side-
effect of the Cold War geopolitical realities. The inclusion of the British would 
eventually lead to complications when negotiating a future treaty on defense 
cooperation. Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s type of opposition is significant because 
many British Eurosceptics reutilized his same arguments to leave in the 2016 
referendum campaign. Nigel Farage, the most widely known British Eurosceptic 
since Thatcher, stated this quite well in the days before the referendum vote:  
As an independent country we would be free to cooperate and trade with 
our European neighbours whilst re-engaging with the wider world including 
our kith and kin in the Commonwealth.17 
 
It should be noted that up to this point, European integration in reality 
consisted of just intergovernmental cooperation and strictly economic integration. 
Despite the varied viewpoints of its participants, this imperfect solution is what 
was manifested within the unique postwar and geopolitical situation. The mixed 
and rough road to establish any cooperation was unquestionably difficult to 
navigate politically. To the credit of the Europeans, it was an immense hurdle to 
                                                 
16. “Press Conference held by General de Gaulle, 14 January 1963,” Western European Union 
Assembly-General Affairs Committee: A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe 1963, 
(Paris: Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs Committee, 1964), 20-22.  
17. Nigel Farage, “Why you should vote for Brexit this Thursday,” The Independent, last modified 
20 June 2016.  
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overcome and no reasonable scholar would suggest that any integration was 
going to be a politically convenient process. This is the major takeaway from the 
1950s and 1960s – the project was and will continue to be a political project 
although originally advertising itself as being an economic one. As Schuman and 
Monnet stated in their declaration, the beginning of European solidarity was with 
France and Germany. There was no widespread support for a shared, common 
trajectory from that origin, as seen in the nationalist posture from de Gaulle. This 
will be important later in the twentieth century as enlargement and a more 
political union takes center stage amid the collapse of the Cold War geopolitical 
order. 
Maastricht and ‘Euro-phoria’ 
Heading into the late 1980s, much of western Europe was integrated into 
the European Communities (EC) – the EEC, EURATOM, and ECSC.18 The 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, 
followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. The geographic groupings of these three 
enlargements is not just a coincidence – EU enlargement hinged upon regions 
and governmental change. If Country A who relied on trade from a nearby 
Country B joined, it is in the interest of Country B to join. On the other hand, 
accession to the EC became a goal if a country shed itself of its past, whether it 
be the British ending its empire after the Suez debacle or the end of the Franco 
                                                 
18. EURATOM, or the European Atomic Energy Community, was integration of nuclear energy, a 
product of settling Cold War insecurities about controlling nuclear materials. 
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regime in Spain. The EC signified humanism and socio-economic progress. The 
enlargement agenda that began in the 1970s changed the dynamics of European 
integration. Rather than being a French-German project of intercontinental 
conflict avoidance based upon economic multilateralism, the EC became the 
‘endgame’ for many countries on the outside. While the enlargement program 
was taking place, a new endeavor to expand integration into new spheres 
commenced. 
Near the later years of his life, then-elected MEP Altiero Spinelli drafted 
several reports in the mid-1980s that encouraged a new treaty to reignite the bid 
for increased political integration. Finally, Spinelli’s draft for a new treaty was 
adopted by the European Parliament.19 This move inspired the European Council 
to relaunch the integration project. The Fontainebleau meetings led to the 
creation and ratification of the Single European Act in 1986.20 This amending 
treaty proposed European exploration into integration of new areas, including a 
common foreign policy and common currency.21 This renewed interest in the late 
1980s is the most significant and concrete contribution by Spinelli, despite his 
long record of advocacy for European unity. 
The passage of the Single European Act in 1986 also sparked a parallel 
vision for Europe that ran against centralization in Brussels and against more 
                                                 
19. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Bulletin of the European Communities, Office 
for the Publications of the European Communities, 14 February 1984.  
20. Conclusions of Fontainebleau European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Office for the Publications of the European Communities, 24 and 25 June 1984.  
21. “Single European Act,” Official Journal of the European Communities 169, EUR-Lex, 29 June 
1987. 
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transferal of sovereignty. The undercurrents of twenty-first century and 
mainstreamed Euroscepticism initiated in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. 
When contemporary media pundits, academia, and naïve, inept observers of 
British politics are surprised about the degree of Euroscepticism and distrust of 
European institutions, they fail to look at the longer history of evidence that would 
support the opposite of that view. While de Gaulle was concerned with British 
incompatibility with continental Europe, Margaret Thatcher expressed the very 
opposite position, specifically European incompatibility with Britain, in her later 
years as Prime Minister. Aside from her legacy of neoliberal reforms to the British 
economy, Thatcher’s major legacy was warning about increased levels of 
integration directed from Brussels, based on principles of supranationalism.22 
This position on Europe was nuanced – she explicitly stated that Britain must 
have a place in political, economic, and cultural Europe, but it does not have a 
place in an “institutional” Europe. In possibly the most famous except from this 
speech, she articulated the language that would become recurring among future 
Eurosceptics:  
Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the European idea 
the property of any group or institution... ...We have not successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a 
European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance 
from Brussels.23 
 
                                                 
22. Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988, 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 
23. Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, 1988. 
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The Treaty of Maastricht, ratified in 1992 and put into effect the following 
year, had little to do with economic integration. It had much more to do with the 
‘making’ of Europe – a ‘forward’ looking Europe. This was the first time the 
European Union was referred to as such in an official capacity, a name change 
that signaled increased consolidation. The three existing organs, the ECSC, 
EEC, and EURATOM, fell under one ‘European Community’ and became 
coordinated with newly established bodies on justice affairs and foreign policy.24 
The European Union consisted of these three pillars, with the latter two 
maintaining an intergovernmental purpose. The most important features of 
Maastricht were the creation of European citizenship and procurement of the 
specific requirements for a common currency.25  
The political reaction to Maastricht allows a more historical understanding 
of the treaty than the actual provisions of the treaty. The treaty was only 
marginally ratified in a French referendum and barely rejected in a Danish 
referendum. While the French government of Francois Mitterrand accepted this 
result, Denmark conducted a winning second referendum with several opt-outs. 
Maastricht served as a turning point. The integration agenda began to be 
marketed to the European voter as an attempt to democratize major alterations 
to the project. From 1992 to present, more referendums on the European Union 
                                                 
24. In listing each founding ‘capital’ of the project, Tony Judt categorized Maastricht as where 
future decisions of the “thing” were negotiated – a jab at the increasingly decentralized 
appearance of European institutions. See Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe, 
(New York: New York University Press, 2011), 109-110. 
25. “Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992,” Official Journal of the 
European Communities 191, Vol. 35, EUR-Lex, 29 July 1992.  
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were conducted than in all previous years, even when excluding membership 
referendums. Despite this, there still existed a democratic deficit – a 
characterization that has been a popular focus of social scientists. Election after 
election to the European Parliament and as more member countries joined, 
abysmally low turnout among the whole of European citizens persisted well into 
the new millennium.  
 
Table 1. Overall Turnout in European Parliament Elections, 1979-201426 
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
61.99% 58.98% 58.41% 56.67% 49.51% 45.47% 42.97% 42.61% 
 
 
Failure to increase the powers of the European Parliament only compounded the 
issue. The amplest of opportunities was squandered during negotiations for the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 – which ironically focused partly on easing potential 
enlargement into the former satellites of the Soviet Union. Many of these member 
countries have among the lowest turnout in European Parliament elections. It is 
unclear if overall turnout will continue to hover where it has been for the past two 
decades. However, what has become evident is that the European Union must 
work to improve turnout in its elections if it wishes to hold itself to a high standard 
of democratic legitimacy. The European elections since the new millennium have 
                                                 
26. “Turnout, Results of the 2014 European Parliament Elections,” European Parliament, 2014. 
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interestingly become ripe ground for hardline Eurosceptics to gain power and 
media attention. 
The introduction of the Euro currency in 2002 was perhaps the biggest 
moment of the European project since its beginning in the 1950s. It was all but a 
dream among the European visionaries of the immediate postwar years. 
However, as what will be described in the following chapter, it has also become 
the most problematic element of the project, especially in recent years. While on 
paper a unified monetary union was supposed to stimulate a European identity 
among its members, this has never materialized. The Eurozone crisis that formed 
because of the overall declination of the global financial outlook tested the 
promises of European integration. Echoing the sentiments of historian Timothy 
Garton Ash, if one lucky person was to freeze themselves early 2005, they would 
be complacent with the state of the European Union.27 His ‘Euro-phoria’ was 
unequivocally true for that time, but history is never linear and has never reliably 
operated in that manner.28 History is a dynamic and volatile process that unfolds 
every second and every minute of every day. Likely the most overused example 
for this type of error is how the September 11 attacks and subsequent War on 
Terror humiliated Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis.29 The era of 
                                                 
27. Timothy Garton Ash, “Is Europe Disintegrating?” New York Review of Books 64, No. 1 (2017).  
28. The term ‘Euro-phoria’ is borrowed from economist Joseph Stiglitz’s use of the term ‘Euro-
euphoria’ to describe people’s perception Euro-led prosperity after 2002. See in Joseph Stiglitz, 
The Euro: How A Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, (London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2016), 114. 
29. Fukuyama’s thesis has been brutally maimed since its publication but remains as a perennial 
example of ahistorical thinking. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National 
Interest, No. 16 (1989): 3-18. 
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European history that has taken place since 2008 works on this same 
presupposition – at the time of this thesis’ publication, the European Union is not 
a closer union. Integration has stalled significantly despite the successes of the 
twentieth century. Therefore, this thesis begins with the first episode - the global 
financial crisis in the European Union. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The beginning of the Global Economic Crisis was triggered by the burst of 
a seriously inflated housing and subprime mortgage bubble in the United States. 
Loose credit and deregulation allowed unqualified borrowers to purchase homes 
at inflated prices, many times for the sole purpose of flipping them and cashing in 
on the rising equity. This model of artificial economic expansion was repeated in 
many areas of the world, but in Europe it was primarily confined to countries such 
as Ireland and Spain. In the high velocity globalized world economy of the 
twenty-first century, contractionary business cycles and a loss of confidence in 
markets spread like wildfire within a short period of time. The crisis in 2008, and 
the years following, is further evidence that the world economy is being shaped 
by the forces of globalization. 
This chapter intends to accomplish three tasks. The first is an exploration 
of why a crisis as dreadful as the one in 2008 would cause the Eurozone to fall 
into dysfunction. The fundamentals of the institutions that created the Euro are 
arguably the most responsible for the currency’s failure. Secondly, it is important 
to understand the numbers of the crisis itself, if only to demonstrate how austerity 
measures did nothing to assist the recovery of the Eurozone’s struggling 
members. Finally, this chapter begins a crucial discussion on the political shifts in 
Germany: a Eurozone member that emerged from the economic crisis both 
economically successful and more powerful in the European Union. These shifts 
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were almost entirely prompted by the Eurozone crisis, as opposed to the long-
term trends that have already existed in European politics for decades. 
Constructing the Euro in a Divergent Eurozone 
Economic divisions have historically defined the European continent, 
typically standing alongside more essential divisions in ethnic makeup, culture, 
language, and governance. One can start in the North-South divide, where the 
Northern countries of Europe have generally been better off than their Southern 
counterparts. The East-West divide is perhaps the most recent economic division 
in memory, dividing the free market democracies from the authoritarian centrally 
planned satellites of the Soviet Union. This is also quite misleading, as the East 
was always historically distinct from the West.30 Within nation-states themselves, 
there have unquestionably existed divisions between industrial-commercial 
centers, the “super-regions” of Europe, and the rest of the country – often 
outperforming political capitals. Catalonia is likely the most extreme example of 
economic “self-sufficiency,” often intersecting with long-held feelings of linguistic 
and cultural nationalisms.31 Since the economic downturn and political crisis in 
Spain, it was reasonable that advocacy for more autonomy or outright 
independence from Madrid intensified. In Catalonia and similar regions of 
Europe, it is common for independence to mean liberation from what separatists 
                                                 
30. Referenced by Tony Judt in A Grand Illusion? on page 127, Larry Wolff argued that the East-
West divides in the Cold War significantly predate 1945. See Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern 
Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, (Stanford: 1995). 
31. Judt, A Grand Illusion?, 112. 
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view as the outdated nation-state and entrance into the sphere of “Europe.”32 
This was the environment that the Euro was constructed within, and only 
scratches the surface why the Euro was likely to fail upon its introduction. 
In establishing the Euro, its founding visionaries did not fully think through 
the potential negative, unexpected consequences of implementing a common 
currency. Of course, there are infinite valuable qualities to having the same 
currency across borders. The most obvious purpose is for travel through and 
relocating between countries. If a European wanted to take an extended road trip 
within the entire Eurozone, which at the time of its establishment included 
Schengen rules, that traveler would not have to juggle national currencies. See 
Table 2 for the list of currencies that ceased to exist following each Eurozone 
member’s adoption of the Euro. This does not include microstates and other 
countries that use the Euro outside the Eurozone.  
                                                 
32. Unlike the unsuccessful attempts made by Catalans over the years to gain more autonomy 
(and in 2017, to unsuccessfully declare independence), Scotland held a legitimate independence 
referendum in 2014. It was struck down by the “No” vote, but what was profound were the 
arguments made by the “Yes” voters. Those voting on the Yes side were anti-Unionist – but Pro-
European, seeing themselves as more European than a part of Britain. An independent Scotland 
would have had to reapply for EU membership – and gain approval from all 28 EU members, 
including Spain. 
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Table 2. Eurozone Members and Their Former National Currencies.33 
Country Currency Year Endeda 
Austria Austrian schilling 2002 
Belgium Belgian franc 2002 
Cyprus Cypriot pound 2008 
Estonia Estonian kroon 2011 
Finland Finnish markka 2002 
France French franc 2002 
Germany German mark 2002 
Greece Greek drachma 2002 
Ireland Irish pound 2002 
Italy Italian lira 2002 
Latvia Latvian lats 2014 
Lithuania Lithuanian litas 2015 
Luxembourg Luxembourgish franc 2002 
Malta Maltese lira 2008 
Netherlands Dutch guilder 2002 
Portugal Portuguese escudo 2002 
Slovakia Slovak koruna 2009 
Slovenia Slovenian tolar 2007 
Spain Spanish peseta 2002 
a. Physical cash ended. 
 
As Table 2 may suggest upon initial glance, the Eurozone is not an 
‘ordinary’ monetary union, but an enormous area that extends over a diverse and 
large population of Europeans, each with differing national economies, histories, 
and cultures. Herein lies the first obstacle to the Euro. While it may have 
expedited travel and business between members, any feelings of unity between 
Europeans, a desire of the currency’s founders, was not immediately realized nor 
was guaranteed to occur. A comparison to the United States illustrates this point 
                                                 
33 “Joining the Euro Area,” European Central Bank, last accessed 15 January 2019.  
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best.34 The Europeans, as much as they distrust the Americans, naïvely compare 
themselves to the United States, which uses a single currency. This is unwise for 
several reasons, but the most important is the unavoidable fact that the United 
States has a common national heritage and culture that is more concrete and 
unified than that of most European countries, regardless of where one might live. 
For this reason, an American moving from state to state will have a much easier 
time doing so – and if for economic reasons no reasonable American would have 
much concern. New arrivals in another state would certainly be welcomed and it 
would never have a net negative impact on the United States national 
economy.35 Replay this scenario in the Eurozone, where say, young educated 
Italians are leaving a recessionary Italy for economic opportunity elsewhere – 
which did happen across the Mediterranean.36 Not only would Italians still living 
in Italy have concern, but there is no assurance that an Italian will seamlessly 
establish themselves in another country or sense that they are “welcomed” by the 
culture or native born citizenry in that country. This scenario does not suggest a 
common experience or that efficient movement within Europe is outright 
impossible, but it should have been something for the founders to consider 
alongside the positive benefits of a common currency. In 1999, the incoming 
                                                 
34 Stiglitz, The Euro, 89-92. 
35. Stiglitz uses a comparison of movement between a rural, underpopulated state like South 
Dakota and an urban, overpopulated state like California to make this point. 
36. Lafleur, Jean-Michel, Mikolaj Stanek, and Alberto Veira, “South-North Labour Migration Within 
the Crisis-Affected European Union: New Patterns, New Contexts and New Challenges,” in 
South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis, ed. Jean-Michel Lafleur and Mikolaj 
Stanek, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017). 
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European Commission headed by Romano Prodi recognized this as something 
not yet reached – a common European identity did not exist despite having the 
most amount of integration the project has seen in its lifespan: 
We come from different countries. We speak different languages. We 
have different historical and cultural traditions. And we must preserve 
them. But we are seeking a shared identity – a new European soul.37 
 
Referring to the previous discussion on the developments in European 
politics during the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of multi-speed integration has 
had an enormous impact on the cohesiveness of the European Union. Like the 
adoption of the Schengen Treaty, not every EU member adopted the Euro 
currency. Denmark and the United Kingdom opted out of the Euro during the 
negotiation and ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty.38 The United 
Kingdom is the extreme case, being one of the largest economies within the EU. 
Following the crash of the pound on Black Wednesday, the pound was pulled out 
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism after only two years of membership.39 The 
economic turbulence of the early 1990s paved the way for a landslide result by 
“New Labour” in the 1997 general election. Without adopting the Euro, the United 
Kingdom experienced significant growth in their economy until the 2008 crash. 
While the United Kingdom had difficulty due to economic confidence, the Danish 
                                                 
37. Romano Prodi, Speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 14 September 1999, 
European Commission Press Release Database.  
38. Denmark received opt-outs after the No vote won a referendum in 1990. Another referendum 
was conducted in 1993 to approve the Maastricht Treaty including the opt-outs, with the Yes vote 
winning. 
39. Larry Elliott, Will Hutton and Julie Wolf, “Pound drops out of ERM,” The Guardian, 17 
September 1992. 
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government had difficulty receiving popular support under the ardently pro-EU 
government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The 2000 Danish referendum on joining 
the Euro resulted in a “No” vote; however, the Danish krone is still a member of 
the ERM. Debates on the EU and determining on entering the Eurozone 
continued to dominate Danish politics well into the 2000s and 2010s. 
If it wasn’t multi-speed integration that would hinder monetary union, it 
would be the design of the institutions themselves. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) has a significant flaw. It pays careful attention on price stability but 
maintains an ambiguous policy attentive to full employment. This is crucial in 
understanding why such a crisis that happened in 2008 and the years following 
would cause major suffering within the Eurozone. Its leading and only mandate is 
price stability, or inflation.40 This is perhaps due to the focus on currency 
valuations leading up to the issuance of the Euro. Alternatively, it could be that 
heavy German influence on the founding of the ECB prioritized controlling 
inflation. Germany has had a fixation on inflation since Weimar-era hyperinflation. 
Also worth mentioning was the selected location of the ECB headquarters in 
Frankfurt. The ECB does have a mandate to control inflation, but most 
importantly lacks any other mandates such as full employment and economic 
stability. For example, in the United States the Federal Reserve was given a 
                                                 
40. “On the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank,” 
Official Journal of the European Union C202 (2016): 231.  
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mandate for full employment in 1946. Recently, they were handed an additional 
mandate for economic growth following the Great Recession.41  
The lack of a multi-dimensional and flexible agenda in the ECB screams 
neoliberalism. The ECB is unique in that its founding took place after the rise of 
neoliberal philosophy in economics, compared to the establishment of other 
major central banks. The ECB accepted that it had social responsibility, but is 
completely self-defeating in its sole reliance on using its mandate on price 
stability to generate recovery and growth in the event of a severe catastrophe. 
Compare this again to the United States Federal Reserve System, where it has a 
dual mandate for both price stability and employment. While the actions of the 
Federal Reserve might be divisive to some economists, it is beyond question that 
it had a much better toolbox than the Europeans to deal with the crisis after 
2008.42 No such anticipation or preparation for an economic crisis was taken in 
the Eurozone. Perhaps the Euro-phoria of the early 2000s was enough to squash 
concerns. Nevertheless, the complete faith in the Euro currency, and more 
broadly the market, underlines the governing philosophy of ECB officials. 
Neoliberalism defined the ECB; thus, it would use neoliberal procedures to 
correct the failures of its members. This will be discussed in the following section 
in relation to the failures in the Greek government and economy after 2008. 
                                                 
41. Stiglitz, The Euro, 146-148. 
42. Stiglitz, The Euro, 157-163. 
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The ECB is also unique in that it is a standalone institution of the 
European Union. As discussed in Chapter One, the EU is an institution based 
upon integration and cooperation of specific functions previously under control of 
competing nation-states: one of the last major functions of EU members that was 
never integrated was social welfare. Therefore, there was a situation from the 
introduction of the Euro in 2002 onward where a Eurozone member used a 
common currency for taxation and government spending, but had no say about 
the spending behaviors of other members. The issue of economic integration 
outpacing political and fiscal integration is possibly the long-term issue at hand in 
the Eurozone.43 This became a problem following the 2008 crisis for countries 
that were already spending well above their limits during the period of growth 
preceding the downturn. Ground-zero for this crisis was the Mediterranean, with 
the most notable Eurozone member, Greece. The following section of this 
chapter explains the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone with a specific focus 
on the Greek Depression.  
Southern Europe and the Greek Depression 
The global financial crisis affected every European country, European 
Union member or not; Eurozone member or not. It showed the amount of 
globalization that had taken place just on the regional scale. Economic 
integration was advertised as a converging force, where the nations of Europe 
                                                 
43. Stiglitz, The Euro, 51-53. 
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would have unified economies. However, the opposite was the case and has 
always been the case. For instance, there is no evidence that in the near future 
the Mediterranean can operate economically on the same level as the Northern 
countries. As shown in the previous section of this chapter, GDP varied not just 
between countries, but within certain countries. The global financial crisis 
aggravated these disparities and led to true divergence in the Eurozone, a 
monetary union founded on the basis that a common currency would uplift the 
lesser economies of its members.  
 
 
Figure 1. GDP Per Capita, Stated in United States Dollars for Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, and the Eurozone, 1986-201644 
 
                                                 
44. “Gross domestic product (GDP), Total, US dollars/capita 1986-2016,” OECD Data, last 
accessed Feb 10, 2019. 
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Figure 1 shows this crucial point by looking at the historical trends of GDP in the 
Eurozone, compared to the Mediterranean. The global financial crisis was 
inevitable; however, it seems to be clear that being a member of the Eurozone 
did not help, but rather hurt the economic recovery of the Mediterranean. It was 
at this point these countries broke away from long term GDP growth trends. 
The global financial crisis hit Greece the hardest out of any European 
country. Foreign direct investments that had inflated the Greek economy to 
unsustainable levels in the early-mid 2000s ceased to come to the aid the 
country in 2009. Combine this major impact on the Greek economy with an 
unreliable tax collection system and bloated government spending on salaries 
and pensions. See Figure 4 on government debt-to-GDP ratios for Greece, in 
addition to Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Most importantly, Greece was not under 
their own currency anymore, but the Euro. The Greek government came to a 
point where they could not raise the funds necessary to sustain their deficits. 
Investors were not confident in lending money to the Greek government, even at 
extremely high bond interest rates. This is on top of increased demand for 
government spending to offset the rise in unemployment. In late 2009, credit 
rating agencies S&P and Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating from A- to 
BBB+ for the first time in about a decade.45 Their credit rating would eventually 
                                                 
45. Helena Smith and Ashley Seager, “Financial markets tumble after Fitch downgrades Greece’s 
credit rating,” The Guardian, last modified 8 December 2009.  
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be reduced to a C, or near-default, in 2011 and 2012.46 Confidence in the Greek 
government and governments across the Eurozone plummeted. 
The European Union and Eurozone members came to an agreement to 
set up a safety net to assist several struggling countries that were under the 
pressure of the global financial crisis, including Greece. The European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and were established by the European Commission and Council of the European 
Union in May and June 2010.47 Under the EFSF specifically, a pool of funds 
accumulated from Eurozone member contributions would be used to make 
bailout loans. Some were exempt from supplying to the fund (see Table 3). 
  
                                                 
46. “Greece – Credit Rating, 1999 to 2018,” Trading Economics, last accessed February 3, 2019.  
47. “EFSF Framework Agreement, Consolidated Version,” European Stability Mechanism, 19 
October 2011, 1-41. 
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Table 3. List of Guarantor Euro-Area Member States with Their Respective 
Guarantee Commitments, European Financial Stability Facility, 201148 
Country Commitments (Millions in €) % of Total 
Germany 211,045.90 27.06% 
France 158,487.53 20.32% 
Italy 139,267.81 17.86% 
Spain 92,543.56 11.87% 
Netherlands 44,446.32 5.70% 
Belgium 27,031.99 3.47% 
Greecea 21,897.74 2.81% 
Austria 21,639.19 2.76% 
Portugala 19,507.26 2.50% 
Finland 13,974.03 1.79% 
Irelanda 12,378.15 1.59% 
Slovakia 7,727.57 0.99% 
Slovenia 3,664.30 0.46% 
Estonia 1,994.86 0.26% 
Luxembourg 1,946.94 0.25% 
Cyprus 1,525.68 0.20% 
Malta 704.33 0.09% 
a. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are “Stepping-Out Guarantors,” meaning that they are not 
obliged to contribute funds to the EFSF. 
 
 
 
The most important point to understand about the EFSM and EFSF is that 
they were intergovernmental as opposed to federal. National governments and 
the executive politicians at the European Union assumed sole responsibility for 
entering and implementing the safety net – not the European Parliament, nor the 
peoples of the European Union. European federalism and the hope of a 
democratic, unified Europe perished. Referring to the EFSF pool, accumulated 
                                                 
48. “EFSF Framework Agreement,” European Stability Mechanism, 19 October 2011, 38. 
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funds were used to bail out Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, hence why they were 
not obligated to provide funds. On the other hand, better-off Eurozone members, 
primarily Germany, shouldered most of the burden. This led to the perception 
that Germany was steering the Euro ship, with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel at the helm. On paper this was not necessarily true, but the consensus at 
the time among the media, some politicians, and general European public was 
that German influence on bailouts was more substantial than what appeared on 
the surface. German economic growth and trade surpluses in the decade 
following the economic downturn emphasizes the credence of this perception. 
With the establishment of the EFSM and EFSF, entering onto the stage 
were the Troika group. Consisting of the European Commission, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB), the Troika were 
the negotiators responsible for handing bailouts to national governments in 
financial crisis. As discussed previously in this chapter, the ECB is an institution 
characterized by inflexibility and neoliberalism. The IMF was no stranger to 
neoliberalism either. The IMF was responsible for bailing out several countries 
globally, with the most notable example in Argentina and their depression at the 
turn of the millennium.49 The typical case for a bailout program was that there 
were strings attached to the loans, otherwise known as “conditionality.” Bailout 
money was withheld until implementation of specific measures, with the most 
                                                 
49. Joseph Stiglitz wrote an extensive critique of neoliberal-driven globalization, observing the 
actions of the IMF and other international institutions. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
Discontents, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002). 
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destructive usually being reducing government spending, known as austerity. 
These conditions would be applied in the case of bailing out Eurozone members 
under the EFSF rules. 
The Troika were responsible for administering two bailout programs to 
Greece.50 The first came in May 2010 under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) government headed by George Papandreou, son of former Greek 
prime minister Andreas Papandreou.51 The bailout package consisted of €110 
billion Euro. Following the implementation of austerity as required by the 2010 
bailout, popularity of his government plummeted and animosity toward the Troika 
skyrocketed. The 2010 bailout marked the beginning of the anti-austerity 
movement in Greece. In order to shore up public support and show the Troika 
that the bailout would be “owned” by the country, Papandreou promised a 
referendum on the bailout package. This went against the wishes of the Troika 
and subsequently, no such referendum was held, leading to more resentment 
among the people.52 Members of Papandreou’s own party began openly revolting 
against his leadership, leading to his resignation in late 2011. The year 2011 
marked the worst year of the Greek Depression, as it was referred to as from 
then on, with an extraordinary 9.13% decline in GDP growth (see Figure 4). 2011 
was also the most violent year in anti-austerity riots and protests. With 
                                                 
50. The Troika also handed out bailout programs to Ireland and Portugal under the EFSF (2010-
2012). 
51. “Statement by the Eurogroup,” European Council and Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 2 May 2010.  
52. Helena Smith and David Gow, “Papandreou scraps Greek referendum as open warfare 
erupts in his party,” The Guardian, last modified 3 November 2011. 
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Papandreou finally ousted from his post, a technocratic government was 
established not long afterwards with the express purpose of implementing the 
conditions of future bailout programs.53 
 
 
Figure 2. Annual GDP Growth (%) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 2006-
201654 
 
 
 
The man to head the new technocratic government in Greece was former 
ECB vice president Lucas Papademos.55 Under his six-month tenure, he led a 
                                                 
53. PASOK was not alone in their demise. The economic crisis coupled with increasing 
resentment toward globalization through free trade and immigration left social democrats crippled 
in most of Europe. 
54. World Bank Open Data, GDP Growth (annual %), accessed January 20, 2019. 
55. Greece was not alone in the ushering in of a technocratic government. Italy also formed a 
technocratic-national unity government led by Mario Monti, lasting from 2011 to 2013. 
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turbulent national unity government that included PASOK, New Democracy, and 
LAOS.56 The relationship between Papademos and the political parties was 
contentious. Despite this, the government agreed to their second bailout program 
in February 2012.57 This bailout package consisted of €100 billion and introduced 
a private sector involvement (PSI), which allowed private creditors to purchase 
Greek bonds with a voluntary option for a “haircut” upon maturation. Public 
reaction was violent and destructive as more austerity was imposed by the 
country’s government. The second bailout resulted in the burning of more than 
40 buildings in Athens and widespread rioting across Greece.58 Austerity-
exacerbated depression led to a long list of transformations in Greek society and 
politics. The back-to-back elections held later that year saw the growth of 
extremist elements in Greek society – most notably the outright fascistic and neo-
Nazi political party Golden Dawn. A new political force in Greek politics known as 
SYRIZA came to power in Greece in 2015. SYRIZA, or the Coalition of the 
Radical Left, is an anti-austerity party that became responsible for fresh 
negotiations with the Troika for more bailout loans – and ironically the 
implementation of more austerity measures over the next few years.59 
                                                 
56. Suzanne Daley, “Economist Named to Lead Greek Unity Government,” New York Times, last 
modified 10 November 2011.  
57. “Eurogroup statement,” European Stability Mechanism, 21 February 2012.  
58. Niki Kitsantonis and Rachel Dinadio, “Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After Riots 
Rage,” New York Times, last modified 12 February 2012.  
59. An anti-austerity party committing to austerity might be indicative of how significant the fiscal 
problems in Greece were. Nevertheless, the damage has been done in Greece and other 
Eurozone members. The youth still suffer tremendously from unemployment, or even worse, 
dropping out of society altogether. It is not clear what other cards the Troika would have to play 
should the global economy contract in the future. 
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Figure 3. Government Debt to GDP Ratio for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
2006-201660 
 
 
 
 While the violence gained media headlines and attention of observers on 
the outside, protests only represent the surface-level manifestation of the 
incredible suffering inflicted upon the Greek people. Poverty and unemployment 
ate away at Greek society and civility. Charts, graphs, and numbers will never 
fully capture this. Echoing the photography project in the United States during 
their Great Depression, a group of Greek photographers went about capturing 
the aesthetic and stories of the people who experienced the Depression.61 This is 
perhaps the largest take-away from the Greek Depression – at the high political 
                                                 
60. OECD Data, General Government Debt, accessed February 3, 2019. 
61. A photography project of the Greek Depression called ‘Depression Era’ was created in 2012 
to capture stories of Greeks suffering from the crisis. Accessible at: https://depressionera.gr/  
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level, politicians and EU bureaucrats carved up Greece, while the people 
themselves were left largely disinterested or powerless. Many left the country, 
like so many others in Europe, to find economic opportunity elsewhere. However, 
politics still lives on in the Eurozone. The following section will conclude this 
examination of the global financial crisis by assessing the political realignment 
that began to take place in Germany amidst the bailouts, protests, and social 
decay in the Mediterranean. 
Germany and Anti-Euro Resentment 
Perhaps the most noticeable change to appear out of the Eurozone and 
sovereign debt crisis was the intensification of national politics in member states. 
Ground zero for the crisis was arguably Greece, as explored in the previous 
section of this chapter. Therefore, the most radical changes in the political 
landscape took place in that country. Nevertheless, political unrest because of 
austerity and Troika decrees was broad and the strongest throughout the 
Mediterranean region of the Eurozone. On the other hand, anti-Euro sentiment 
assembled in unlikely, unscathed places in response to the measures taken by 
their governments to rescue the failing economies of the Eurozone. The purpose 
of this section is to touch upon the political realignment that picked up pace 
during the Eurozone crisis, namely the pervasiveness of an alternative political 
movement in Germany. 
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) political party is very much an 
exception in contemporary European politics. The party is typically grouped into 
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the family of right-wing populist political parties found in Europe. While this 
categorization is problematic due to ideological discrepancies between parties, it 
clarifies the long-term and broader political winds that have swept through 
Europe since the 1990s. Chapter Four of this thesis will investigate the 
complexity of these types of movements and their impact on their respective 
countries and the European Union. Nevertheless, the AfD is unique in that it was 
only founded in 2013, primarily as an anti-Euro currency party and more 
significantly as a right-wing political voice against the Angela Merkel-led CDU. 
One of its founding members, Bernd Lucke, specified their political location at 
their first conference: 
We want to put an end to the flagrant breach of democratic, legal and 
economic principles that we have seen in the past three years, because 
Chancellor Merkel’s government said there is no alternative. Now it is 
here, the Alternative für Deutschland.62 
 
The AfD is the most successful national political party in Germany to run 
further right to the CDU since the founding of the FRG, surpassing the more 
extremist, neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). Under 
the leadership of Lucke, running from its founding in 2013 to his ousting in 2015, 
the party attracted a sizeable coalition of the German electorate on its anti-Euro 
platform.63 In its first attempt to enter the Bundestag in the 2013 federal election, 
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its policy positions on European affairs were characteristically Eurosceptic, 
advocating for the elimination of the Euro and return of sovereignty to national 
parliaments, but limited in the defense of the common market:  
We call for an orderly dissolution of the Euro area. Germany does not 
need the Euro... ...We affirm a Europe of sovereign states with one 
common internal market.64 
 
These types of policy positions reflected two specific sentiments of its 
founders: party members, and voter base. Firstly, it was a response to the 
undemocratic nature of the Eurozone, both in its initial implementation and 
contemporary maintenance of the crisis. The AfD had a particular issue with the 
CDU-FDP coalition’s decision to ratify Germany’s participation in the EFSM, 
EFSF, and later the ESM, without a referendum of the German people. 
Furthermore, their manifesto made in explicit terms that private financial 
institutions, not the German taxpayer, should bear the burden for rescue policies. 
Secondly, it sympathized with the plight of the debt-laden members of the Euro, 
proposing debt forgiveness and approval of referenda on Euro currency 
membership. While the AfD barely missed the required 5% threshold in 2013, 
they would later go on to gain seats as elected members of the European 
Parliament in 2014. In 2016, they scored several big gains in state elections, the 
most notable being in Saxony-Anhalt where AfD won second place in the popular 
                                                 
AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?" German 
Politics 24, no. 2 (2014): 1-25. 
64. Text in original form: “Wir fordern eine geordnete Auflösung des Euro-Währungsgebietes. 
Deutschland braucht den Euro nicht... ...Wir bejahen ein Europa souveräner Staaten mit einem 
gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt.” The full text of party positions can be found in “Wahlprogramm 
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vote. From its founding in 2013 to present day, no other political party wishes to 
govern with the AfD, resulting in incredibly complicated and politically painful 
coalitions after state elections. Being such a young political party, these gains are 
impressive when compared to other right-wing populists who have contested in 
elections for decades. 
No matter how successful the AfD will be in the future, the realignment 
has already occurred and there is no going back. Germany, a country long 
thought to be the bastion of European unity and most immune to right-wing 
populism, has made room for political outsiders and the radical right through its 
involvement in remedying the Eurozone crisis. It shall be noted that the AfD 
started as an anti-Euro party but quickly shifted to anti-immigration campaigning. 
This is what will be discussed in Chapter Four. The AfD along with so many other 
political forces across Europe quickly prioritized campaigning against immigration 
following the European Migrant-Refugee Crisis. However, in the following 
chapter, this thesis will first take a glance at the principal adversary of the 
European Union in the arena of foreign policy – Putin’s Russia. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
RUSSIAN MEDDLING ON THE NEW PERIPHERY  
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Europe is a perennial battleground for the clash of major world powers. 
Adjusting for scale over the years, a balance of power on the continent has 
consistently been the norm. Competition between city-states and kingdoms 
evolved into competition between powerful nation-states and empires. A defining 
political characteristic of Europeans in their history is the propensity to make war 
over recurrent disruptions to the balance of power. Likewise, Europeans hold the 
role of being the peacemakers of their continent. While the breakdown of 
diplomacy causes war, it must be remembered that diplomacy ends wars. The 
end of wars either reinforce balance of power, incrementally shifts balance of 
power in a certain direction, or completely transforms international relations.  
The most obvious transformation is the emergence of international conflict 
between the United States and Soviet Union towards the end of World War II. 
While the British and French held power in postwar global institutions such as the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), they were for all intents and purposes 
reduced to second-tier powers. The nucleus of interstate competition that had 
been present in Europe for centuries was supplanted by global international 
conflict between two new superpowers. On postwar defense policy, many 
European armies scaled back their militaries and relegated this responsibility to 
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the outside superpowers, either voluntarily or against their will.65 The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense alliance formed in 
1949 and led primarily by the United States. It includes most of the European 
countries held within the American-British-French sphere of postwar influence at 
the end of World War II.66 As its name suggested, NATO created an Atlantic 
military alliance defined by Atlanticism. This was very different from military 
alliances of the past, where the United States was adamant in their attempt to 
maintain neutrality. On top of this relationship was the Marshall Plan, or the 
European Recovery Program, where the United States sent large amounts of 
direct relief to Europe, even those becoming increasingly under the thumb of the 
Soviets.67 Some Europeans were ambivalent to the extent of assistance, which 
were reflected in major splits within politicians in the postwar era.  
While the Marshall Plan assistance expired in the 1950s, the continued 
intrusion of the United States into European affairs remained contested among 
the Europeans. As alluded to in Chapter One, the ECSC was an attempt for 
Europeans to take control of their own postwar destiny and accept responsibility 
for their own continental affairs.68 Despite the EEC being established following 
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the Treaty of Rome in 1957, there were still some voices of support for expansion 
into other areas, such as defense and security. Some were enthusiastic, and 
some were skeptical about further integration. The EDC was abandoned when 
the French voiced strong opposition to such a radical surrender of sovereignty, 
and even then its establishment would be met by American protest. Thus, NATO 
was reluctantly accepted as the hegemonic defenders of Europe that we still see 
today, well after the collapse of its opposite Soviet assemblage of countries 
inside the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw 
Pact). 
The collapse of the USSR did not shift the balance of power in Europe, or 
in the world for that matter. The Russian Federation (or Russia) was not 
guaranteed to succumb to the influence of the West, nor change views on 
important issues such as respect for human rights, preference toward democratic 
rule, and market liberalization. Russia’s status as the number two proprietor of 
nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked, a fact that many unfortunately overlook 
or outright forget. However, most importantly is the regime of Vladimir Putin, 
whose presence in international relations is epitomized by boisterous alarmism or 
uninformed lethargy. As this chapter will propose, Putin has managed to 
resuscitate intercontinental conflict in Europe, mostly in an attempt to counter the 
aforementioned intrusion of what he views as Western influence invading the 
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‘Russian sphere.’ Traditionally this type of European conflict has been presented 
as simply the ‘West’ versus Russia. This chapter takes a different perspective 
and defines the major conflict as a developing struggle between the European 
Union and Russia. International relations scholars might disagree on which 
power holds more justification in their behavior and action, but what is clear is 
that history will show that as the European Union expands its own sphere, it does 
so into a diminished Russian space. 
The Russo-Georgian War and the Revival of Geopolitics in Europe 
The first major reassertion of Russia in Europe after the termination of the 
Soviet Union came in August 2008 in what would be called the Russo-Georgian 
War. While this war was brief, lasting only five days, and was clearly one-sided 
toward the Russian military, it stands as a key component in the larger picture of 
international relations in the European region after the Cold War. Before 
understanding the actual war and the pretexts for conflict, it is important to set 
the stage as to why Russia, under then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, would 
have the motivation to war with the small country of Georgia. 
Unlike the largely peaceful revolutions in Europe that brought an end to 
Soviet-directed communist governments, Georgia’s independence from the 
actual Soviet Union was not without conflict between the various ethnic groups 
that reside within its borders. Throughout its history under Soviet communism, 
the regime that governed the Georgian SSR attempted to establish an efficient 
command economy amongst competing ethnic groups while pleasing their Soviet 
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bosses. Similar to the Balkans, the North Caucasus region is home to various 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups that don’t necessarily fit together in perfect 
nation-states. In the late 1980s, extreme nationalism flourished in the two 
autonomous SSRs within the Georgian SSR: the Abkhazian ASSR and South 
Ossetian ASSR. Amid the backdrop of Gorbachev’s reformism under glasnost, 
the governments of these two autonomous republics within Georgia were 
emboldened to demand more autonomy at the same time as the Georgian SSR 
proper desired to gain its own independence. The early 1990s were the most 
violent years, where Abkhazian and Ossetians in both these regions ethnically 
cleansed and displaced thousands of Georgian people.69  
Upon gaining independence, Georgia sought to eliminate autonomy for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This immediately enflamed already-prevalent 
hatred toward the Georgian people and government. After brief wars marred by 
atrocities and intermittent Russian involvement on behalf of the separatist cause, 
a peace agreement was brokered in 1992 between Russian and the Georgian 
governments to end the South Ossetian conflict.70 The next year (1993) a 
ceasefire was also brokered between Abkhazia and Georgia.71 The outcome was 
that these two regions would be de facto independent, but internationally 
observed as part of Georgia. While the United Nations was responsible for the 
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Abkhazia-Georgia buffer zone, Russia was responsible for peacekeeping 
between South Ossetia and Georgia. The peacekeeping situation in South 
Ossetia became important when considering some of the causes for the Russo-
Georgian War. The major result immediately after the ceasefires was that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia became de facto independent states, but de jure 
recognized as Georgian territory. The tension in the region, much like most inter-
state ethnic conflicts seen around the world, remain sensitive for many years 
afterward. 
While Putin’s ascendancy to power in the 2000s altered the status quo 
between Georgia and Russia, significant transitions in Georgia were more 
profound and ultimately changed the course of international relations in the 
region. In 2003, the Georgian presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze was met with 
mass protests following unfair parliamentary elections and extensive corruption 
within the government.72 These peaceful, nonviolent protests were led by Mikhail 
Saakashvili, a pro-Western opposition leader to the Shevardnadze regime. In the 
Rose Revolution, Georgia shed itself of its Soviet-defined and contemporary 
Russian-oriented government in favor of closer ties with the West, fundamentally 
expressed by interest in NATO membership and accession to the European 
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Union.73 Fresh elections in 2004 saw the Saakashvili become President of 
Georgia and his party United National Movement obtaining a majority in the 
Georgian Parliament. The new government sought to reintegrate the lost 
republics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an issue that needed to eventually be 
rectified if seeking membership status of NATO or the EU. Likely not 
coincidental, Saakashvili’s election to President in 2004 happened in the same 
year as the single biggest enlargement of the EU in its history. In one year alone, 
ten countries joined the EU, with seven being former members of the Eastern 
Bloc (see Figure 4). In addition to joining the EU, the ardently anti-Russian Baltic 
states also signed up for NATO, the first time Russia proper shared a land border 
with NATO.74 
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Figure 4. Enlargement of the European Union, 1973-2013.75 
 
 
This was the larger geopolitical context behind the 2008 Russo-Georgian 
War.  At the regional level, tensions would incrementally escalate between the 
Russians and Georgians, as well between the South Ossetia and Georgia in the 
mid-2000s. The opposing Georgian-backed leadership within South Ossetia 
signaled that Russian recognition of South Ossetia would mean a return to war. 
Things would come to a head when South Ossetian leader Eduard Koikoty 
expressed his desire to be recognized and annexed by Russia that in July 
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2008.76 Furthermore, tensions were exacerbated by attacks on police forces from 
South Ossetia and Georgia. In the first few days of August, women and children 
were evacuated to locations in the immediate North. Initial media reports alleged 
that shelling was started first by the South Ossetian separatists and Georgia 
retaliated by bombing the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Russian 
interference was also alleged before August 8. Later, these allegations turned out 
to not be the case, first in cables leaked by WikiLeaks, and further confirmed in 
an independent fact-finding report funded by the European Union.77 On the 
contrary, Georgia was deemed responsible for firing first by bombing separatist-
controlled areas on the night of August 7, 2008. Also important was that the 
Russian government was not intent on going to war; at the time of war breaking 
out, Medvedev was in Belgium and Putin was at the opening ceremony of the 
Summer Olympic games. However, Russia was very prepared if war with 
Georgia occurred. 
As predicted, Russia used this provocation as the best chance to cripple 
the capacity of the Georgian military and move the situation in their favor. While 
small advances into South Ossetia were made by Georgian forces on the 
morning of August 8, the Russian military advanced from North to South and 
pushed them well back into Georgia, nearing Tbilisi by August 11. Atrocities were 
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committed by both sides.78 A second front was opened on the Black Sea and 
through Abkhazia. On August 12, a ceasefire was successfully put into effect. 
The agreement essentially ended the fighting, and Russian forces had to 
withdraw back into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see Figure 5). The brevity of 
this war cannot be stated enough; however it had major implications on the 
trajectory of EU (also nominally NATO) expansion and its role in international 
relations. 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 2019. 
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The Russo-Georgian War, while being a minor skirmish with limited 
casualties, concluded with the Russians emerging with more victories than any 
other participant. The Georgian military and infrastructure were decimated, thus 
stopping the expansion of NATO into Georgia and the South Caucasus. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the backbone for defense of the EU is NATO; EU 
accession of Georgia was politically and geographically distant.  Russia gained 
more of a foothold in the Black Sea and built military installations in the two 
breakaway republics, both officially recognized by Russia soon after the war. 
Domestic approval of the Russian government skyrocketed. The war taught 
Russian leadership, primarily Putin, that opportunities should be taken under the 
best possible moment, so much as to not risk full out war with the other nuclear 
powers, but making an impact large enough to expand Russian interests abroad 
and boost his popularity at home. Also important was the co-opting of Western-
style geopolitical strategy and history of military interventions with the result of 
turning it against them. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the 
bombing of South Ossetians in Tskhinvali by the Georgians was comparable to 
the history of genocide and course of contemporary action surrounding Kosovo, 
and was deserving of Russian involvement to stop the alleged genocide from 
taking place: 
This situation has undergone dramatic development for 17 years now. For 
17 years the Russian Federation has been carrying out a peacekeeping 
mission, helping to maintain peace and calm there, preventing the killings 
that have taken place there since the start of the 1990s, and trying to 
preserve the unity of the Georgian state. But the aggression and genocide 
unleashed by the Saakashvili regime have changed the situation. Our 
51 
 
main mission was to prevent a humanitarian disaster and save the lives of 
people for whom we are responsible, all the more so as many of them are 
Russian citizens. We therefore had no choice but to take the decision to 
recognise these two subjects of international law as independent states. 
We have taken the same course of action as other countries took with 
regard to Kosovo and a number of similar problems.79 
  
The logic stated by Medvedev was characteristic of Putin’s approach to foreign 
affairs, and Medvedev’s presidency had virtually no effect on the political 
contiguity of this worldview. It would not expire with the end of the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War, but only strengthen into the 2010s. 
As a blanket statement, the European Union did not succeed in this 
situation, but it did not necessarily fail either. While having the appearance of a 
major economic and political power, the EU alone lacked the authority or military 
prowess to intervene in the negotiation process. The EU had a foreign policy – in 
this case, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that included Georgia – but 
did not have the military to protect its interests. A fundamental component to 
diplomacy is having a military force, otherwise what country would take the EU 
seriously? Additionally, Georgia was not a member of the EU or NATO, therefore 
there was no clear international justification to become involved militarily. The 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana 
did communicate his worry to both foreign ministers from Russia and Georgia, 
but note his deference to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the international community:  
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I am deeply concerned over the dramatic situation in Georgia and I 
deplore the loss of human lives and the suffering inflicted on the civilian 
population. I spoke with Sergey Lavrov and Eka Tkeshelashvili and called 
on both to spare no efforts to obtain an immediate cease-fire. We will 
continue to work relentlessly with the parties and the international 
community, in particular the OSCE, to help find a peaceful way out of the 
crisis.80 
 
However, during the time of the war, the Treaty of Lisbon was still not in effect 
until 2009, which provided new provisions that expanded the powers of the High 
Representative. Thus, French President Nicolas Sarkozy entered the fray and 
brokered the ceasefire deal on behalf of “Europe.” While Sarkozy was the current 
President of the European Council that was constantly on rotation, it is unclear if 
he was representing the EU, France, or France’s description of a ‘European’ 
foreign policy. The radical position held by some was that he was solely acting as 
the French President and the EU took a back seat. One of the few to articulate 
this in the European Parliament at the time was Nigel Farage: 
Mr. President, I address my remarks to the President-in-Office of the 
Council. President Sarkozy, it was your own energy, dynamism and 
initiative that sent you off to Georgia and Russia to try and broker a deal. 
You did it off your own bat. You were not acting on behalf of the European 
Union. It is a delusion if anybody in this place thinks you were. There had 
been no Council meeting, there was no resolution and there was no 
mandate. You did it as the French President, and well done to you.81 
Sarkozy responded to, or rather dismissed, Farage’s comments: 
Mr. Farage, I did not have a mandate – that is undeniable – but, quite 
frankly, neither did the Russian troops when they entered Georgia. You 
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are one of those people who, for years, have denounced Europe for a lack 
of political will. I had a choice: I could ask for everybody’s opinions and 
take no action, or act and then check whether the others agreed. I prefer 
action.82 
Regardless, it is a debate on whether negotiations were truly handled by the EU. 
President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso accompanied 
Sarkozy in his talks with Medvedev, but Sarkozy received the credit and criticism 
for the negotiated deal. It is also rather interesting that Sarkozy, a proponent for a 
‘Mediterranean Union’ to prevent certain countries from joining the EU, was 
called upon to negotiate this ceasefire deal that would salvage a country outside 
the EU. Sarkozy was a known opponent to Georgian membership of NATO.83 
The response to the Russo-Georgian War, regardless of French or European 
political standing, was done by Sarkozy, the President of an intergovernmental 
institution of the EU, and without a mandate from any other EU institution or 
national government. What other option was there? There was clearly none, but 
this example of diplomacy is indicative that the EU aggressively pursued 
expansion but did nothing to aggressively defend it. 
The conclusion of the Russo-Georgian War was just a taste of what was 
to come as the EU focused itself on expanding into the outer fringes of the 
Russian sphere. For Putin, the 2004 expansion into the Baltics was enough. 
Putin was not willing to allow Ukraine, who shares a fairly large border with 
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Russia and has a sizeable Russian linguistic minority, succumb to what he 
viewed as unjustified ‘imperialist’ expansion from the West. The crisis in Ukraine 
from early 2013, 2014, and beyond was a repeat of the kind of themes 
surrounding the Russo-Georgian War, but different circumstances allowed the 
conflict to drag on eternally with no clear solution. Russia took a more active and 
immediate role in perpetuating its presence in Ukraine. Compared to the already-
existent ethnic conflict in Georgia that saw a quick, practical solution to end the 
war, the conflict in the Ukraine will attempt to copy the template of inter-ethnic 
conflict in Georgia but involve more complex, ideologically motivated, and 
artificially induced methodology to contest EU expansion. 
The Ukrainian Euromaidan and the Russian Response 
 The crisis that unfolded in Ukraine is arguably a repeat of the Georgia 
debacle in 2008, but should be considered fundamentally different in its 
ambiguous outcome and long-term impression on the European continent. The 
situation in Ukraine beginning in early 2013 was the second episode of Russian 
involvement, and similarly to Georgia, there is a specific chain of circumstances 
that occurred over a period of about a decade. Putin’s motivations for interfering 
in Ukraine are quite clear, but several vital alterations in his strategy should be 
noted and are important in understanding why the conflict at the time of this 
thesis’ publication is still unresolved. 
 Ukraine, similar to Georgia and other former Soviet republics, has a post-
independence history of egregious kleptocratic governance, electoral fraud, and 
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the circumvention of legal and economic systems. The wave of protests that hit 
Georgia in their 2003 Rose Revolution that encouraged Western-style 
liberalization and economic reforms, also had the same impact in Ukraine in their 
2004 Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution, which was triggered by an 
ambiguous second round presidential election result between Viktor Lushchenko 
and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, was a period of peaceful protests and 
demonstrations against the government’s handling of the election. President 
Leonid Kuchma and his government backed by parliamentary support from 
Yanukovych were alleged to have fixed the election against Lushchenko. This 
was predominantly the case, both in the media coverage and actual election 
processes.84  
Lushchenko, despite his status as an established insider of the government brief 
tenure as Prime Minister, was more inclined to support closer ties with the West, 
including NATO membership and initiation of the process toward EU accession. 
His electoral base consisted of mainly the Ukrainian-speaking, Western oblasts 
of Ukraine.85 Yanukovych, like Lushchenko, was also well established within the 
apparatus of Kuchma, but held more power and influence as Prime Minister. He 
was viewed more positively by Russia and was more in line with Kuchma’s 
orientation on positioning Ukraine between Russia and the West. However, 
Yanukovych was not as charismatic compared to Lushchenko, and it would take 
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an extraordinary amount of weight to produce a result with Yanukovych as the 
winner in a second round.86 Ukraine was far from a liberal democracy already, 
but the reaction to this election via Orange Revolution was indicative to how 
much the Ukrainian kleptocracy was willing to risk in order to put one of their 
cronies in power. 
 Perhaps the only aspect of the Orange Revolution worth mentioning was 
that it was largely peaceful and ensured that a fraudulent election would be 
annulled and rerun with a proper outcome. Lushchenko was not out of the 
woods, and Ukraine was not going to radically transform out of its post-Soviet 
shell. Internal division between the victorious parties of the Orange Revolution 
and more of the corruption and baggage from the Kuchma years disrupted the 
stability of the Ukrainian government. This is one condition that made 
Euromaidan in 2014 unavoidable: instability. The average Ukraine citizen wished 
nothing more than stability, whether it be in one direction toward the West and 
EU, or toward Russia. The differences between the two electoral spheres 
between the Western oblasts and the South and East oblasts would continue 
well past the 2004 election. The presidential election in 2010 resulted in 
Yanukovych winning based not on popularity among the whole country, but the 
electoral math needed for more than half of the votes coming from his electoral 
and regional base in the East and South. This was the second condition that 
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made Euromaidan possible; that the Orange Revolution had not succeeded and 
the very person the Orange Revolution was intended to oppose took the 
presidency. With the presidency secured and a government in the Verkhovna 
Rada later confirmed, albeit fraudulently, in 2012, Yanukovych had the political 
power necessary to reorient Ukraine’s international standing. 
 In the most forthright sense, the Euromaidan Revolution that began on 21 
November 2013 and ramped up in the early months of 2014, was a continuation 
of the many issues demonstrated in the Orange Revolution. The protest began 
as a small, peaceful demonstration in Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square), protesting Yanukovych’s decision to permanently shelve 
the association agreement between the Ukraine and the EU from Russian 
pressure.87 In recent years, Russia has had excessive influence over the 
Ukrainian economy. One significant example is in natural gas inflows into the 
country. Russia has used this as a bargaining chip, most notably in 2010 when 
Yanukovych agreed to a 30% reduction in gas prices in exchange for extending 
the lease on Russia’s naval base in Crimea.88 This is one component of Putin’s 
so-called ‘Special War’ that has been conducted upon not just post-Soviet 
countries, but also on the rest of the European continent.89 The alternative for 
                                                 
87. Ian Traynor and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins 
tug of war,” The Guardian, last modified 21 November 2013. 
88. Luke Harding, “Ukraine extends lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” The Guardian, last 
modified 21 April 2010.  
89. Glenn-Iain Steinback, "Russia in Transition: A Political and Social History of the Dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Evolution of Capitalist Reform, and the Creation of Putinism, 1985-2015,” 
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations, California State University, San Bernardino, Paper 
158 (2015): 204-205.  
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Ukraine, instead of the European Union, was planned entrance into Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s authoritarian, state-capitalist model for 
economic integration, later formalized in 2014.90 Ukraine, not by choice, was 
unfortunately the geopolitical location for the clash between these two 
supranational organizations. One major consequence of Euromaidan was 
aversion from the path toward the EAEU, but as this section will later explain, it 
will come at a cost. 
By the end of that last week of November, demonstrations were 
encouraged by opposition political parties and their leaders, especially using the 
Internet and social media (See Figure 6). Online communication and accessible 
digital technology played a key role in the development of the Euromaidan 
protests, both in the Ukraine and the coverage abroad.  
 
 
 
                                                 
90. The EAEU is undoubtedly Putin’s resurrection the Cold War-era ‘Comecon’ economic area 
under clear domination from the Soviet Union, however the fundamental difference here is 
‘appearance.’ EAEU institutions are similarly structured to the EU, except as camouflage for 
Putin’s agenda. 
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Figure 6. Tweet from Arseniy Yatsenyuk on 21 November 2013.91 
 
 
The violence from the police upon the growing crowds of Ukrainians in the 
Maidan, and vice-versa only compounded the protests. In the end, they were a 
clear channel for the decades of frustration with Ukraine’s oligarchic government 
structure and the absence of the rule of law.92 This was perhaps most evident in 
the mainly pro-European opposition leaders and their supporters coordinating 
revolutionary and defensive efforts with ultranationalists and outright fascists that, 
surprisingly to some observers, hate Russia.93 The main objective was to remove 
Yanukovych from power, which did happen only after months of police brutality 
against the revolutionaries in Kiev and the situation in Ukraine became too 
                                                 
91. Translation reads: “All at #Euromaidan! Yanukovych does not understand any other language 
except Maidan. So we have to show that the power is us! Join!” Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Twitter Post, 
November 21, 2013, 1:22 AM.  
92. Timothy Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World," Slavic 
Review 74, no. 4 (2015): 703. 
93. The ultranationalists in Ukraine, unlike several Eurosceptic, radical right-wing to far-right 
parties in Europe such as the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) in France and 
others, see Russia as the clear enemy and the Ukrainian oligarchs as enablers of Russian 
influence over Ukrainian sovereignty. 
60 
 
dangerous for him to continue as President. Not surprisingly, the ideologically 
and linguistically divided nature of Ukraine led to a counterrevolution in areas that 
statistically identify more as Russian than Ukrainian: the Donbas and Crimea. 
Russia took advantage of this opportunity to invade Ukraine. 
 Once Yanukovych abdicated his position as President, Russia invaded 
Crimea and heavily assisted separatists (some of whom were Russian nationals) 
in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.94 While the takeover of Crimea was 
rather seamless, the Donbas became an essential stalemate between Russian 
military-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military. Comparable to the 
situation in Georgia, this war became a foreign policy issue largely of Russian 
creation. From Putin’s perspective, a full-blown invasion of Ukraine was not a 
card he could play for fiscal reasons and to not provoke an actual war with 
Western powers. Sanctions from the international community was a price he 
could pay, or indeed, circumvent completely. By keeping the Donbas as an 
ambiguous zone of control for a fiscally low-cost, perpetual war, Putin can 
preserve European participation in his diplomatic game, or indeed, his Special 
War.95 
                                                 
94. The Donbas region is known as geographically the basin that contains the Donets River, but 
politically are considered the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine. The names of the two de 
facto independent states are the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in the West and the Luhansk 
People’s Republic (LPR) in the East (see Figure 7). 
95. Glenn-Iain Steinback, “Russia in Transition,” 204-205. 
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Figure 7. Map of Ukraine with Crimea and Separatist Republics, 2019. 
 
 
 
As stated previously, the European and more broad international response 
was condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and interference in the Donbas. It 
is in Putin’s better interest in his geopolitical strategy to hold off on recognizing 
the separatist republics and play that card when the least risky opportunity 
arises. Recognition of Donbas as separate from Ukraine undermines his long-
term strategy to keep Ukraine contested as long as possible. Thus, what was the 
EU to do about the crisis? The successor to Javier Solana as the EU High 
Representative was Catharine Ashton, serving from 2009 to 2014. 
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Notwithstanding her meetings with the “stakeholders,” her efforts came across as 
weak, indecisive, and underwhelming.96 
We want to underline very clearly that there is still time to avoid a negative 
spiral and to reverse current developments. We call on the Russian 
leadership not to take steps to annex Crimea and instead to take steps to 
deescalate this crisis.97 
 
Ashton’s incompetence in the Ukraine situation might be the result of general 
inexperience with diplomacy, which was one point of critique of her 2009 
appointment. On the other hand, she was able to reconcile Serbia and Kosovo in 
their relations, which ironically is one pillar of disgust in Putin’s worldview.98 
There was to be no reversal and Putin was not going give up Crimea on his own 
will, both for practical reasons as well as the popularity boost he received from 
the annexation. It should always be recalled that Putin is a realist, compared to 
the idealist EU. Under the same breath of those comments from High 
Representative Ashton, most of the action done on behalf of the EU in this 
situation was in economic sanctions put on Russia throughout 2014.99 As stated 
beforehand, Putin was willing to bear the cost of sanctions if that meant he could 
keep Ukraine contested via the occupation of Crimea. Economic sanctions and 
                                                 
96. Ashton literally used the term ‘stakeholders’ in one of her statements, which is arguably a 
poor choice of language for resolving issues surrounding sovereignty and borders. Under the 
research conducted, finding the specific statement was quite difficult; the link to the statement 
was broken and only by obtaining an Internet-archived version was the document retrieved. See 
Catharine Ashton, “Statement by EU High Representative Catharine Ashton on the developments 
in Ukraine’s Crimea,” European External Action Service, 1 March 2014.  
97. Catharine Ashton, “3304th Council Meeting Press Release Main Results of the Council, 
Ukraine,” Council of the European Union, 17 March 2014, 2. 
98. Piotr Smolar, “Serbia and Kosovo sign historic agreement,” The Guardian, last modified 30 
April 2013.  
99. Catharine Ashton, “3304th Council Meeting Press Release Main Results of the Council, 
Ukraine,” Council of the European Union, 17 March 2014, 2. 
63 
 
diplomatic pressure on Russia, and assistance to the Ukrainian government were 
the only options the EU pursued.100 This may be the reason why calls for a 
European Army have grown since then (see Figure 8). While Crimea under firm 
Russian control via the succession of military occupation, questionable 
referenda, and annexation as part of the Russian Federation, the conflict in the 
Donbas continued to persist. 
 
 
Figure 8. Tweet from Jean-Claude Juncker on 20 May 2014.101 
 
 
 
 The War in Donbas closely resembled the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
conflicts in Georgia, both in execution and in attempted resolution by European 
leaders. Negotiations for the first Minsk Protocol (Minsk I) were conducted 
between Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and unofficially the separatist leaders from 
Donetsk and Luhansk. Minsk I called for a slew of ceasefire provisions, more 
local control of separatist areas, and restrictions on foreign involvement through 
                                                 
100. “EU Restrictive Measures,” Council of the European Union, 29 April 2014, 1. 
101. Jean-Claude Juncker, Twitter Post, May 20, 2014, 1:16 PM.  
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military assistance or equipment.102 Separatists broke the agreement and fighting 
started once again. There appears to be a relationship between the similar timing 
of the betrayal of Minsk I and the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement in the week following the first Minsk summit. Fighting continued and 
the line of control between the Ukrainian military and separatists became more 
violent with more casualties.  
The second Minsk Summit in February 2015 intended to once again 
resolve the conflict, this time on a multilateral basis including participation from 
President Lukashenko of Belarus, President Hollande of France, Chancellor 
Merkel of Germany, President Putin of Russia, and President Poroshenko of 
Ukraine. The agreement, known as Minsk II, included many provisions of Minsk I, 
but also expanded to address humanitarian issues, respect of Ukrainian 
sovereignty, and vague promises for more autonomy for the separatist-controlled 
areas.103 Despite these two peace arrangements, the fighting in Donbas 
continued. Complex issues understandably require complex resolutions. The 
passive role of the EU in the Donbas situation likely compounds the crisis, but at 
the same time diplomatic efforts might not be taken seriously. They were forced 
to relegate that diplomatic responsibility to the OSCE, a non-EU but European 
affiliated intergovernmental organization. Instead, the EU has prioritized in 
actively assisting the Ukrainian government on their way toward potential 
                                                 
102. “Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement), 
9 September 2014,” United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 5, 2019. 
103. “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 12 February 2015,” 
United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 5, 2019.  
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accession. This assistance was clear in the ratification of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement throughout 2015 and 2016, which allowed Ukraine 
access to the European common market. There is change occurring in EU 
attitudes toward Russia. Compared to her unimpressive predecessor, High 
Representative Frederica Mogherini appears to be more nuanced and active in 
her approach to EU-Russian relations. The EU has long been an adversary of 
Russia, while at the same time individual countries have built bilateral 
relationships with Putin. EU leaders will quickly realize that Russia is needed for 
economic and energy cooperation, thus it is important to have some compromise 
with Russia in the near future. Nevertheless, as long as each side remains 
entrenched in their negotiating positions, Ukraine will continue to go down the 
road of being designated as a perpetual frozen territorial conflict, much like 
Kashmir between India and Pakistan. 
For now, Putin’s strategy has been successful in the Ukraine and Georgia. 
The forced establishment of pro-Russian ‘gray zones’ in several candidate 
countries for EU accession or NATO membership complicates processes related 
to joining these intergovernmental organizations and alliances.104 Ukraine, while 
an EU free trade associate, will not have the ability to join NATO in the near 
future as long as the situation remains the status quo in Donbas. Full-fledged 
                                                 
104. The term ‘gray zone’ was used in an academic collaboration on the less-talked about 
peoples who live on the borderlands of the European Union and in these internationally 
unrecognized territories. The primary inspiration for the term was Holocaust survivor Primo Levi’s 
categorization for those not entirely complicit with or victimized by the Nazi agenda. See Ida 
Harboe Knudsen, et. al. Ethnographies of Grey Zones in Eastern Europe: Relations, Borders and 
Invisibilities. (London: Anthem Press, 2015). 
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Ukrainian EU membership seems less likely for the time being, especially since 
oligarchs maintain their influence on the government despite the Euromaidan. 
While the geopolitical situation on the EU periphery has transformed, the next 
and final chapter of this thesis will examine political dissent of the EU that was 
brewing on the domestic front and culminated in the United Kingdom leaving the 
EU project altogether, which has been the largest shakeup in Europe since 1991. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
OPPOSING THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE MARRIAGE OF  
EUROSCEPTICISM AND POPULISM 
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the European Union is not without 
its critics, some of whom are ironically elected members of the European 
Parliament. The intricacies of opposition politics became as complex as the 
European Union. As the EU project marched towards an ever closer union and 
the democratic deficit continued to widen since passage of Maastricht in 1992, 
the volume of the dissent became louder and more plentiful. This section is 
dedicated to analysis of the positions of those opposed to union, and how they 
were able to put pressure on their national governments and the EU under times 
of crisis. 
While the history outlined here is primarily focused on the periodization 
following 2008, it should be remembered, and as alluded to in Chapter One, that 
the EU has a mixed track record with referendums since Maastricht. Rejection of 
European institutions in popular referenda was quite common, and from most 
surprising member states. Most referenced by Eurosceptics, the defeat of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Constitution) in 2005 by 
France and the Netherlands, two founding members of the ECSC, was a pivotal 
moment in European integration. If it had been implemented, the Constitution 
would have been a significant step toward federalization of the European Union 
and the gradual abandonment of the ‘treaty’ framework that led the integration 
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process in the past. Instead, the French and Dutch referendums indicated that a 
significant portion of Europeans were not willing to make that transition. After the 
two ‘no’ results, the brakes were applied on the Constitution and all future 
referendums regarding the Constitution were cancelled. It would be futile to 
proceed with referendums in the rest of the EU when two substantial members 
had rejected the matter. 
In contrast to the structural framework of the European Constitution, 
further integration had no other option but to continue down the previously 
utilized treaty framework and more emphasis was placed upon ratification 
through national legislatures as opposed to national electorates. This culminated 
in the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which allowed specific 
institutional reforms that would have been implemented had the Constitution 
been ratified in 2005.105 Specifically, it would remove the processes that would 
require referendums for amendments to the Rome or Maastricht treaties. Lisbon 
was decisively the triumph of intergovernmentalism in the EU. It was ratified quite 
easily by all member states with the exception of the referendum in Ireland, 
which despite its rejection in the first of two attempts, was eventually approved. 
Following the initial ‘no’ vote in Ireland, European leadership did not consign 
Lisbon to the same fate of the Constitution. Instead, a second referendum in 
Ireland was called after minor changes were made to the text of the Irish 
                                                 
105. “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,” Official Journal of the European 
Union C306 (2007): 1-271. 
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Constitution that allowed ratification of Lisbon. This sequence of rejections and 
subsequent maneuverings around rejections are seen by some Eurosceptics as 
a ‘betrayal of democracy.’ Nigel Farage had made this point clear time and time 
again in the European Parliament about how the EU leaders have a particular 
issue with referendums that do not go their way: 
Madam President, nobody else has said it, but I will: well done the Irish! 
And yet, before the official result was out, there was Mr. Barroso, holding 
a press conference in Brussels, looking as shifty and as dishonest as 
anybody I have ever seen, saying – despite what the rules of the club are 
– that the Treaty is not dead and we continue. Frankly, it was a disgusting 
display; it was an insult to democracy. It is perfectly clear that the 
ratifications should stop now and the implementation of the Treaty should 
stop now.106 
 
And after the second referendum, Farage cited that the EU dumped money into 
Ireland to ensure the likelihood of a ‘yes’ vote: 
Mr. President, well, it is all terribly simple really, isn’t it? We have had one 
vote against the Treaty in Ireland and one vote for the Treaty in Ireland, so 
if we have any sort of sporting sense, we ought to make this the best of 
three; but the difference is that with a third referendum, let’s make it a free 
and a fair referendum. Because what has happened in Ireland most 
certainly is not that! In fact, I hope you are all very proud of yourselves 
because what you have done is you have taken the littlest boy in the 
playground, got him into the corner and given him a good kicking. This is a 
victory for the bully boys; it is a victory for big money and a victory for 
bureaucrats. The whole thing was a travesty!107 
 
The controversy surrounding the European Constitution and Treaty of 
Lisbon is just one instance of dispute for Eurosceptics in the European 
Parliament. However, as preliminarily recognized in Chapter One and Two, 
                                                 
106. Nigel Farage, Preparation of the European Council following the Irish referendum (debate), 
18 June 2008, Strasbourg, European Parliament, last modified 21 October 2008.  
107. Nigel Farage, Preparation of the European Council following the Irish referendum (debate), 7 
October 2009, Brussels, European Parliament, last modified 2 December 2009. 
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critical opposition to the EU appears in many different forms and from different 
member states – referendums are just one avenue. This chapter aims to explain 
the phenomenon of Euroscepticism as a political force and how its marriage with 
populism became effective in precipitating change (or none at all) within the 
European Union. 
Identifying Eurosceptics and Populists 
In Chapter One, this thesis identified French President Charles de Gaulle 
and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as two significant voices that 
exemplified skepticism toward the European Union as it expanded into its 
present-day institutional scope and sequence. The disparate but like-minded 
perspectives of these two individuals are characteristic of Euroscepticism itself. 
De Gaulle can be considered as an inward Eurosceptic; a stubborn 
intergovernmentalist and champion of French superiority within the European 
project. Thatcher, the opposite, was more or less an outward Eurosceptic; 
wishing to defend British interests from intrusion from a growing European 
bureaucracy.108 The complexity of just these two individuals’ perspectives is only 
scratching the surface, as they both were politically on the right-wing and were 
fundamentally well-recognized members of the established political order. 
Sincere opposition to the European Union, termed Euroscepticism, would only 
                                                 
108. The inward-outward labels were realized by several of the authors whose pieces appeared 
in Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür, Key Controversies in European Integration, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
71 
 
gain steam just as Thatcher was on her way out in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Euroscepticism is regarded as a catch-all, comprehensive term to 
describe a distinct type of skepticism and criticism of the European Union and its 
institutions and the overall trajectory of European integration. 
Identification of anything usually requires determining what it is not. If 
Euroscepticism was expanded to include any criticism of the European Union, 
this would arguably comprise some of the most enthusiastic, marginally fanatical, 
supporters of the EU who believe action on the European level has not gone far 
enough. This would include many individuals in the upper echelons of European 
politics, including some in the European Parliament. Former Prime Minister of 
Belgium and leader of the Liberal group in the European Parliament, Guy 
Verhofstadt, epitomizes this class of political actors, as seen in just one fiery 
speech in the European Parliament: 
Indeed, ladies and gentlemen, I think that either Europe will become 
federal or it will cease to exist. The choice is as simple as that. We must 
stop being afraid of words and afraid of using the word ‘federal’ when we 
talk about the future of Europe. It is, in fact, a federal solution that is 
needed, a solution that will give us a real economic government, which we 
need, real democratic control, which we do not have at the moment, a real 
European treasury and a real federal budget, and, why not, in the future, a 
solution that will lead us one day towards a real European army. We have 
no choice. European federalism is the only way of integrating ourselves 
into globalisation, the only way of negotiating on an equal footing and the 
only way of maintaining our economic and political role. It is also the only 
way of protecting our social model in Europe.109 
 
                                                 
109. Guy Verhofstadt, Future of Europe (debate), 9 May 2012, Brussels, European Parliament, 
last modified 9 May 2012.  
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Verhofstadt has proved to be a foremost proponent of increased integration and 
equally the most willing to challenge Eurosceptics in many European Parliament 
sessions, often debating the likes of Nigel Farage. It would be a miscalculation to 
group these two individuals, Verhofstadt and Farage, as belonging to the same 
category of politicians. For these reasons, this class of individuals who are 
positive critics of the EU cannot be considered as Eurosceptics. 
Euroscepticism is dynamic in that it is fundamentally both a catch-all term 
and politically exists as a profoundly divided cohort in European politics. In the 
broadest sense possible, Eurosceptics on the right tend to focus on issues 
related to culture or national sovereignty, such as immigration. The EU’s stance 
on free movement of peoples has unmistakably spawned more Euroscepticism 
on the right. On the other hand, Eurosceptics on left commonly emphasize 
economic issues related to how, for instance, the EU facilitates neoliberal 
interpretations of free market capitalism and profoundly caters to the interests of 
multinational corporations. Even this portrayal of ideological differences is 
problematic, as many Eurosceptics on the right quite often make sovereignty 
arguments in economic terms, such as criticism of the EU’s monopoly on free 
trade arrangements with foreign powers. Likewise, some Eurosceptics on the left 
see the EU as a threat to the effectiveness of the nation-state social democratic 
welfare systems. These divisions are apparent in the European Parliament, 
where to their disadvantage Eurosceptic groups lack cohesion even as their 
numbers grow (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Composition of the First Session of the 2014-2019 European 
Parliament.110 
 
 
 
Even Eurosceptics on the right, who are more numerous and louder than 
those on the left, have the most divisions in the European Parliament.111 At the 
beginning of the 2014-2019 European Parliament, the two biggest groups on the 
right who are considered Eurosceptic, the European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 
group, are separate only because of longstanding differences on how to 
                                                 
110. “Results of the 2014 European elections, 2014 opening session,” European Parliament, last 
modified January 7, 2014.  
111. For the most part and with mixed perspectives on European integration, left wing 
Eurosceptics reside in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). For the purposes 
of this thesis’ argument, focus will not be directed on this group. 
*GUE/NGL 
(7%)
S&D (25%)
Greens/EFA 
(7%)
ALDE (9%)
EPP (29%)
*ECR (9%)
*EFDD (6%)
Non-Iscrits 
(7%)
*Eurosceptics
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approach the EU.112 Divisions within individual groups regardless of their political 
orientation also occur. The Hungarian political party Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán is 
a member of the federalist center-right European People’s Party, yet hardly 
subscribes to that group’s stance on European integration. Orbán and his party 
only continued to exist within that group to take advantage of its influence in EU 
government.113 More often than in national parliaments, Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs) are not always tied down to groups and sometimes defect to 
others, thus slightly altering the composition of the European Parliament between 
elections. New groups may form. In 2015, a sizeable portion of the Non-Iscrits, 
which make up MEPs that do not belong to any group, formed a new Eurosceptic 
group called Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) not depicted in Figure 9.114 
Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders and their respective 
French and Dutch political parties represented in the European Parliament, the 
ENF group comprised several right-wing to far-right MEPs from across Europe. 
The 2014 European Parliament was the most Eurosceptic in the 35 years 
of its history, mainly as a result of the low turnout described in Chapter One, but 
also the Eurozone crisis described in Chapter Two. Despite these divisions, 
                                                 
112. The ECR and EFDD groups are also not unified due to their leadership, which to a degree 
mirrors political division on the right in the United Kingdom. ECR was founded following the 2009 
European Parliament election. ECR was led in the 2014-2019 European Parliament by the British 
Conservative Syed Kamall, while the EFDD was led by UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader 
Nigel Farage. This division will be made clearer later in this chapter. 
113. As this thesis is being written in early 2019, Fidesz was suspended from the EPP after years 
of continued campaign rhetoric against EPP leadership and the domestic policies of Orbán 
related to migration issues and rule of law. 
114. Alissa F. Rubin, “Far Right Parties Form Coalition in European Parliament,” New York 
Times, last modified June 16, 2015.  
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Eurosceptics have been able to grow within the European Parliament. If 
Euroscepticism is a metaphorical bludgeon to EU politics, the populism displayed 
often by Eurosceptics is a vital driving force behind that bludgeon. Populism is 
not an ideology, rather it is a campaign strategy; a particular projection of one’s 
political beliefs. It is rhetoric that exploits political and socio-economic divisions 
within a liberal democracy and reduces politics to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite.’115 
While some who espouse populism would disagree and especially self-identified 
right-wing populists, populism mimics the economic basis of Marxism that pits the 
proletariat against the bourgeoisie.116 While populists are not calling for violent 
revolution per se, they are messengers of radical interpretations of liberal 
democracy and attempt to convey prescriptions to advance change. The most 
irrational component of populism, which alludes to the same degree in criticism of 
Marxism, is the fact that ‘the people’ are just not well-defined just as ‘the 
proletariat.’ Who are ‘the people’ when not all people within the electorate 
support a populist party? This is just one intellectual exercise in populist logic and 
how it functions in Western liberal democracies. Regardless of its apparent 
fallacies and similarly its critics, populists gain power when traditional political 
forces fail. 
                                                 
115. For a contemporary and well-rounded definition of the populism discussed in this thesis, see 
Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 
(Penguin Random House, 2018). 
116. The forgotten, but arguably best example for contemporary populism resides with the rise of 
the Dutch academic turned politician Pim Fortuyn, active the early 2000s Dutch politics. He is 
interesting not just for his ability to interact effectively with the media to promote his anti-
establishment, anti-immigrant agenda. Before his rise, he was an avowed Marxist and member of 
the Dutch Labor Party. 
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In the case of Eurosceptics, this already effective populist strategy is 
compounded by the fact that the European project is relatively young, open-
ended, and encourages division between its member states. Populist rhetoric fits 
the structure of the EU perfectly, especially at times of crisis where both national 
and EU institutions are ineffective. Eurosceptics are able to voice concerns about 
how ‘the elites’ of the EU in Brussels are detached from the interests of ‘the 
people.’ The marriage of Euroscepticism, a rather mundane approach to 
European politics, with populism proved to be a politically lethal force to the 
political establishment in times of crisis. With respect to the EU, Eurosceptic 
right-wing populists tend to have more success than their left-wing counterparts 
because the EU is perceived as a threat to national sovereignty, a fact that plays 
more intensely to the interests of the political right.  The European project since 
its beginning has existed to keep its members pinned down.117 Contrary to some 
observers’ views that contemporary populism is something brand new resulting 
from the post-2008 crises, right-wing populists have existed and been successful 
in Europe for quite a long time in the postwar period (see in Table 4). Populism is 
not a new phenomenon nor a long-standing European political tradition. 
 
 
 
                                                 
117. For example, the ECSC and Common Market was intended to keep the Germans in check in 
the immediate postwar years. Later on, Germany promised to sacrifice its national currency for a 
European currency in exchange for German reunification in the early 1990s. 
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Table 4. Nationally Active and High-Profile Right-Wing Populist Political Parties in 
the European Union.118 
Country Political Party 
Years of Inclusion in 
Parliamentary 
Governmenta  
Austria Freedom Party of Austria 
1970-1971 
1983-1986 
1999-2006 
Denmark Danish People’s Party 
2001-2007 
2015- Present 
Finland Finns Party 2015-2017 
Greece Independent Greeks 2015-Present 
Hungary Fidesz 
1998-2002 
2010- Present 
Italy Northern League 
1994-1996 
2001-2006 
2008-2011 
Latvia National Alliance 2011-2015 
Lithuania Order and Justice 2012-2016 
Netherlands Party for Freedom 2010-2012 
Poland Law and Justice 
2005-2007 
2015-Present 
Slovakia Slovak National Party 
1992-1998 
2006-2010 
2016-Present 
Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party 
1990-1996 
2004-2008 
2012-2013 
a. Some parties included in the chart were not historically considered populist, but for the purpose 
of demonstrating that these groups existed long before 2008, all years of previous government 
participation is shown. 
 
 
 
                                                 
118. The chart only includes governments that were led by or included right-wing populist political 
parties before 2016. Chart data was gathered from government websites and corresponding 
newspaper articles. Noticeably absent from the chart are the French National Front, UK 
Independence Party, and Alternative for Germany, all of which have exerted different forms of 
political pressure in their respective democracies before and after 2016. The chart does not 
include dissolved political parties. 
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A reasonable explanation for the lack of collective wisdom regarding 
populism’s relatively effective record could be that it was not truly developed in 
the Anglosphere, principally in the United States and United Kingdom, until 
recently. In 2016, the United Kingdom referendum on EU membership and the 
election of Donald Trump to United States President, with the former contributing 
to the conclusion of this chapter and this thesis as a whole, were two ‘shock’ 
events that put contemporary right-wing populism on the map in those respective 
countries. The UK Independence Party, ascendancy of Nigel Farage as a key 
political disruptor in British politics, and pressure on the political establishment to 
allow a referendum on EU membership are discussed later in this chapter. 
Regional differences between right-wing populists are a note of special 
interest. It is no accident that most of the countries listed in Table 4 were formerly 
governed by communists. Most profoundly in Poland and Hungary, Eurosceptic-
streaked populism is utilized by powerful parties such as Law and Justice and 
Fidesz respectively to assert their desires for more independence within the EU. 
At the same time, Poland and Hungary benefit more than others from their EU 
membership, thus developing a peculiar relationship with European institutions. 
More economically developed EU members such as Austria and the Netherlands 
contain right-wing populists that are critical of EU and national stances on cultural 
liberalism and relaxed immigration controls. In particular, the Dutch Party for 
Freedom led by Geert Wilders, an unapologetic critic of Islam and its 
compatibility with Western culture, has such radical positions on immigration and 
79 
 
assimilation. Wilders and many similar to him will benefit electorally from issues 
such as Islamic terrorism both in Europe and abroad. Their highly controversial 
perspectives will string together immigration and terrorism issues to attack both 
their national governments and European leaders’ supposed incompetency to 
secure Europe. 
The political parties discussed above were all represented in the 
European Parliament groups discussed earlier. They were able to broadcast their 
messages in plenary sessions and across alternative forms of communication 
such as the Internet and social media. It cannot be stated enough that the 
intense globalization of political communication over the past few decades 
benefited those who could use it effectively. Whether it be Euromaidan in 
Ukraine, or the Arab Spring revolutions in 2010 onward, tools of communication 
originally intended for social networking were rapidly adopted as platforms for 
political communication. Nevertheless, a demonstrable turning point for 
Eurosceptic populist factions occurred in 2015: the year that saw large and 
unsustainable amounts of economic migrants and refugees inundate the 
European Union. This crisis, which will be briefly described in the following 
section, provided terrain for radical political actors to capitalize on the EU’s 
indecisiveness.. 
Turning Point: The European Migrant Crisis 
The European Union is no stranger to refugees; a notable example was in 
the early 1990s where moderate numbers of them fled persecution and violence 
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in the former Yugoslav republics.119 The EU is not unfamiliar to economic 
migrants either. One of four pillars of the EEC was to allow the free movement of 
persons between member states, as established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
The Schengen Treaty in 1985 removed all internal border checks among its 
ratifying member states and created an external border check system called 
Frontex.120 Large numbers of Europeans from former communist states in search 
of better economic opportunities took advantage of these regulations (or lack 
thereof) as their countries were accepted in the EU. To its credit, the EU was 
able to perfect its internal borders. Geographic proximity and an EU that was 
smaller and more cohesive proved to have invaluable advantages in handling 
these situations. The proximity of World War II also played a decisive role, as 
Germany stepped up to bear the burden of migrants as a means to redeem itself 
from its past atrocities. These situations, the Yugoslav crisis and fall of the 
communist governments in the East, involved European people as opposed to 
people from elsewhere. While there was skepticism from right-wing populists 
within countries about the influx of foreigners, these foreigners were, at the very 
least, of European origin and national governments responded accordingly. 
Immigration and refugee issues were already well established in the political 
culture of many EU member states by the end of the 2000s. 
                                                 
119. Henry Kamm, “Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst Since 40’s,” The New York Times, 
July 24, 1992.  
120. “Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985,” Official Journal of 
the European Communities L239 (2000): 19-62.  
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The crisis that should be referred to as the European Migrant-Refugee 
Crisis took shape at the beginning of 2013. Observers made the mistake of 
identifying it as either a migrant crisis or refugee crisis, when in reality it 
encompassed both, which are not the same. All refugees are migrants, but not all 
migrants are refugees. In most literature and media coverage of migration issues, 
scholars mention push and pull factors. For the purpose of this thesis, this 
framework is slightly modified to describe the factors that caused a large volume 
of people to leave their countries of origin and the reasons why the EU was not 
prepared to receive them. 
The push factors, or the reason for the mass volume of people that 
evacuated the Middle East and North Africa, is separated between long-term and 
short-term factors. The global, long-term trend in migration since the end of 
World War II is movement from the global south to global north. Most of the 
global south are developing countries with weak governments, unstable 
economies, and a high propensity for violence. In many of these countries, wars 
have taken place over the course of decades and the flow of refugees has 
persisted as long as the wars have continued. Afghan, Palestinian, and Somalian 
refugees comprise the vast majority of refugees in recent years.121 While the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has existing 
structures to facilitate the settlement of refugees from these specific countries, it 
                                                 
121. “Detections of IBCs,” Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency, last modified 
April 3, 2019.  
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is largely unsustainable for the sheer scale of the problem. It is not surprising that 
many of the refugees that ended up trying to get into Europe were from these 
countries. 
Short-term factors are the most complex, and ultimately led to some of the 
difficulties in how the EU responded. The Arab Spring, or the period of 
revolutions in Middle Eastern countries that overthrew several autocratic 
dictators, led to the sort of conditions necessary for an unmanageable migration 
crisis. While some of these revolutions changed politics in several Middle Eastern 
countries, in others the insurgents were either unsuccessful or at odds with each 
other in civil wars. Syria became engulfed in a dreadful civil war between the 
government of Bashar al-Assad and a wide swath of armed groups. Daesh, or 
colloquially known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was the most radical 
group to emerge from the Syrian Civil War. Daesh became responsible for 
causing immense suffering upon the peoples within the borderlands of Iraq and 
Syria in addition to conducting a professional propaganda campaign that was 
responsible for inspiring numerous terrorist attacks around the world. Following 
NATO intervention in Libya to assist the overthrow of autocrat Muammar 
Ghaddafi, the power vacuum left behind warring rebel factions and what 
essentially amounted to a failed state. Libya and Syria served as two potential 
points of departure for those migrating to Europe. 
A fair perspective is that Europe was unprepared for the crisis as a matter 
of geography. As discussed previously, the European Union was able to perfect 
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its internal borders through the Treaties. However, external borders of the EU are 
immense and complex. The European continent itself is only a small extension of 
the larger Eurasian continent; in the most basic sense it is peninsula of 
peninsulas.122 The EU land and oceanic borders are most ‘clean’ in the North 
and West. The United Kingdom and Ireland are excluded from the Schengen 
area, but non-EU members Switzerland, Norway, and several microstates are 
participating in Schengen rules (see Figure 10). In the Northeast, the Schengen 
Area only borders the four non-EU countries of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and 
Moldova. The Balkan Peninsula is the most complex land border configuration in 
the whole of the EU, with Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania outside Schengen, but 
Greece included. Several former Yugoslav republics are neither in Schengen or 
the EU.  
                                                 
122. Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe, (New York: New York University Press, 
2011), 45. 
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Figure 10. Map of the Schengen Area Including Non-European Union Member 
States, 2016.123 
  
 
 
The geographic contours of the Mediterranean Sea form the entire 
Southern border of the EU, with the exception of two Spanish holdings in the 
African country of Morocco and a small land border between Greece, Bulgaria 
and Turkey. The Mediterranean is directly adjacent to the Middle East and just 
one step away from sub-Saharan Africa, two of the most violent regions on Earth. 
The purpose of the European Neighborhood Policy was not just to send much-
                                                 
123. The UK and Ireland depicted in red are EU opt-outs of Schengen. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
and Romania shown in gold are candidate EU members for Schengen. Iceland, while not shown, 
is also part of the Schengen Area but is not an EU member state. Andorra, located on the border 
of France and Spain is the only European microstate not in the Schengen Area. 
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needed economic assistance to countries surrounding the EU, but also to keep 
favorable relations with their leaders so that Europe did not share borders with 
unstable countries. When Libya and Syria fell into disarray, so did their ability to 
keep the ‘cork in the bottle’ on the migration from areas that border them.124 It is 
fathomable to suggest that the breakdown of diplomatic relations and ongoing 
conflict in these two countries intensified the European Migrant-Refugee crisis. 
Thus, human traffickers were able to flourish in the Mediterranean (see Figure 
11). 
 
                                                 
124. The phrase ‘cork in the bottle’ is borrowed from Wikileaks founder Julian Assange in a 2016 
interview where he described the role Libya played in allowing increased migration from Africa. 
The removal of Gaddafi and the subsequent power vacuum allowed Libya to become a failed 
state, reaching to the point of a second, lengthy civil war beginning in 2014. Assange used this 
phrase in his larger criticism of 2011 NATO intervention in Libya to remove Gaddafi, but it 
illustrated the bigger picture of why migration existed in the central Mediterranean Sea, arguably 
the most dangerous route. 
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Figure 11. Illegal Border Crossings (IBCs) on the Eastern Mediterranean Route, 
2008-2016.125 
 
 
 
If it was not geography that predestined Europe and the EU to have this 
sort of crisis, it was the inconsistency of the messages coming from within the 
European Union. Common asylum policy has been a matter of debate between 
old and new member states over the course of many decades and many different 
situations. Dublin III Regulations signed by most EU members in 2013 governed 
                                                 
125. Eastern Mediterranean Route is defined by Frontex as land and sea arrivals in the Eastern 
Aegean Sea and Greek islands. On their website, data from other routes is available, but are 
incredibly miniscule compared to the Eastern Mediterranean. “Migratory Routes, Eastern 
Mediterranean Route, Trends prior to 2017,” Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 
accessed 5 April 2019.  
87 
 
asylum applications, stating that a refugee must apply in the first EU country they 
arrive.126 When Germany under the directives of Chancellor Angela Merkel 
suspended these rules in September 2015, countries on the external border of 
the Schengen Area and the EU constructed fences along those external borders. 
Hungary was the most notable example. Viktor Orbán was unwilling to capitulate 
to German demands to allow arrivals to move through Hungary without 
registration, a violation of the Dublin arrangements. The border fence was 
portrayed as Orbán’s so-called ‘strategy’ to not allow arrivals to settle in Hungary 
in defense of his position on European and Hungarian culture. He defended the 
fencing in a press conference as a measured response to protect the external 
border of Schengen, as well as stated that the burden of asylum applications was 
problematic for Hungary: 
The German Chancellor and Austrian Chancellor said clearly: nobody can 
leave Hungary without being registered. So that is the regulation. We have 
to register everybody. We can’t let anybody from Hungary to go to Austria, 
to Germany, without being registered. So it’s not strategy, its slow 
enforcement.127 
 
In the same press conference, he referred to the whole situation as a ‘German 
problem,’ reminding the press that it was the Germans who promised policies like 
quota systems and de facto opened the whole of Europe to migration. Hungary 
                                                 
126. “Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person,” Official Journal of the European Union L180 (2013): 
31-59.  
127. Ian Traynor, “Migration crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness,” The Guardian, 
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was just one of several culturally conservative former communist countries and 
their governments who acted subversively against the requests of the EU and its 
most powerful members. 
The enormity of the European Migrant-Refugee crisis aggravated 
Eurosceptics and gave a breath of fresh political air for populists to assemble 
against EU and national institutions. Particularly in Germany, it enabled the 
Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), a political party that was already critical of 
Merkel’s handling of the Eurozone crisis, to assume more hardline stances on 
culture and immigration issues. The departure of Bernd Lucke from the party in 
2015 indicated the party’s shift from a moderate, conservative, anti-Euro platform 
to radical, nationalist right-wing politics and anti-Islam activism.128 In a similar 
process, the AfD’s dominant voter base shifted from disenchanted conservatives 
in the West to politically dispossessed voters in the East. Conservative-leaning 
East Germans who had previously remembered the CDU as arbiters of the 
reunification process soon found themselves at odds with their tendencies to 
form grand coalitions and moving toward the political center. Even under the 
indecisive leadership of Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen and party infighting, the 
AfD managed to produce key electoral breakthroughs in 2015 and 2016 that 
rattled German politics, long thought to be the most stable out of all postwar 
democracies. 
                                                 
128. “German AfD founder leaves party decrying xenophobic shift,” Reuters, last modified July 8, 
2015.  
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What was to be done about the incoming migrants and refugees? If the 
political pressure was not enough, it was the sheer humanitarian issue of people 
putting their lives in the hands of human traffickers to makes that dangerous 
journey across the Mediterranean Sea. To the European Union’s credit, the 
Council managed to find a diplomatic solution in the Eastern Mediterranean in 
March 2016, and in the Central Mediterranean later on in 2017.129 Negotiations 
with Turkey resulted in essentially EU access for Turkish nationals and EU 
money for refugee settlements in Turkey in exchange for drastically enforcing 
controls on their land and sea borders with the EU.130 This settlement, while 
having some criticism from EU members, solved the immediate crisis of human 
trafficking and related deaths, as well as relieved some of the pressures put on 
Frontex and their affiliates in the Aegean. 
No matter the attempts to solve the external border crisis, the political 
damage had already been done by the beginning of 2016. Eurosceptics and 
populists took advantage of the situation by intensifying their rhetoric against the 
‘establishment’ and in the direction of migrants and refugees. While here it was 
not discussed, ISIS-inspired terrorism gripped the continent and added a 
complex layer to the crisis. It was an unfortunate situation that groups like Daesh 
simultaneously forced people from their lands and radicalized European 
                                                 
129. A similar agreement was reached in March 2017 with Libyan authorities, known as the Malta 
Declaration. From the Frontex data, it appears it has worked to help stop the flow in the Central 
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nationals. In particular, the terrorist attack against French satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in 2015 stood out as the most symbolic of the European struggle 
between religious tolerance and freedom of speech; and the debate on how 
precisely to maintain a secure society. Ultimately the issue of immigration, 
migration, and secure borders dominated in political campaigns across Europe. 
Perhaps the most significant political campaign in all of postwar Europe took 
place in the United Kingdom – the campaign to leave the European Union. 
Hyperdemocracy and the Road to Brexit 
There is much to be said about Brexit, the colloquial expression used to 
describe the Britain’s exit from the European Union (or the related 2016 
referendum). The amplified visibility of news coverage on British politics since the 
referendum is arguably equivalent to the amount of academic literature published 
on the referendum. It would be an understatement to pronounce that the 
referendum on EU membership was a watershed moment. Brexit is a decisive 
issue in European politics. This thesis takes the position that Brexit could have 
only happened in light of the problems discussed throughout the preceding 
sections and chapters. In particular, the Eurozone crisis and European Migrant-
Refugee Crisis had a significant impact on British politics. However, those 
problems alone are not sufficient for that conclusion. In truth, Brexit was the 
culmination of a perfect storm of the long-term factors discussed briefly in 
Chapter One and short-term factors emphasized in this section on the backdrop 
of the issues discussed in the thesis as a whole. 
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For some years, Brexit and the course of contemporary British politics was 
je ne sais quoi. The phenomenon was difficult to describe because nothing 
equally comparable to it had occurred in the past. In reality, the roadmap for 
understanding Brexit, or at least its ‘cognitive’ place in politics, was already 
existent. The theoretical discussion of ‘hyperdemocracy’ raised by British political 
theorist Stephen Welch provides the missing link. Hyperdemocracy, or as Welch 
defines it, is the intensification of democracy.131 The mechanisms of democracy 
become democratized themselves, and every level of society itself becomes 
afflicted by politics.132 In the case of Brexit, the referendum took a central, well-
marinated issue in British politics and allowed the electorate to supposedly ‘once 
and for all’ determine their country’s relationship with the EU. 
How can hyperdemocracy be illustrated through Brexit? Intensification of 
democracy does not necessarily mean more elections, but in the case of Brexit, 
the related issues – namely issues surrounding immigration and national 
sovereignty – took center stage across multiple elections. Specifically, the issue 
was most intense in the 2014 European Parliament elections and 2015 general 
election, both of which were instrumental in conducting a referendum. The 2014 
European Parliament elections, as discussed at great length in this thesis, 
resulted in the most Eurosceptic European Parliament to date. In Britain, the 
rejectionist Eurosceptic, right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) led by 
                                                 
131. Stephen Welch, Hyperdemocracy, (New York: Palgrave McMillian, 2013), 1-4. 
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populist juggernaut Nigel Farage won these elections with a plurality of votes and 
thus, held the largest number of British seats in the European Parliament. Rather 
than focusing who should represent Britain at the European level, the election 
was quite literally a debate on ‘in’ or ‘out,’ as characterized by the BBC and LBC 
debates between Farage and then-Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg of the 
Liberal Democrats. While being a highly divisive political figure, Farage came out 
on top in these key debates and the election result reflected this. The low turnout 
2014 election nevertheless became a powerful ‘strategic’ vehicle for the mostly 
Eurosceptic electorate to express their frustrations with British politics.133  
The year 2014 represented a fundamental shift in British politics and 
indicated that a referendum on EU membership was a convincing possibility at 
that moment. For a lack of a better term, the 2014 elections ‘spooked’ the British 
Conservatives led by David Cameron. Under the leadership of Cameron, the 
party consistently attempted to project an image favorable to the young, middle-
class, urban dwellers while quieting the concerns of hardline, Eurosceptic 
backbenchers represented by the European Research Group (ERG). Pressure 
from this minority within the Conservatives resulted in Cameron giving his 
infamous Bloomberg speech in 2013 where promises were made to renegotiate 
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Britain’s place in the EU and a referendum on membership itself.134 While this 
speech satisfied the likes of the ERG, it had virtually no effect on relieving the 
pressure from UKIP and Farage the following year. David Cameron had the 
impossible task of maintaining his party’s place in government, sans Liberal 
Democrats, in the leadup to the 2015 General Election. 
Luckily for David Cameron and the Conservatives, no such electoral 
catastrophe occurred in the 2015 election. Despite having only 37% of the 
popular vote, the convoluted, constituency-restricted electoral system in the 
United Kingdom produced a majority Conservative government to the surprise of 
the pollsters and media. Even with the rise of UKIP and perceived weakness on 
the campaign’s dominance of issues of concern to the political right, Cameron 
was able to produce a victory for his party. The 2015 result guaranteed that 
Cameron was able to fulfill his promises in the 2013 Bloomberg speech and 
suppress the concerns of the Eurosceptic members of his party. The same year, 
the British Parliament passed the European Union Referendum Act 2015 and a 
referendum became legally required beginning in early 2016.135 The referendum 
on membership was supposed to complement Cameron’s negotiations with the 
EU, under the assumption that the result would be in favor of remain. In a 
February 2016 speech, Cameron announced that the referendum would take 
                                                 
134. David Cameron, “EU speech at Bloomberg,” Government of the United Kingdom, last 
modified January 23, 2013. 
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place on June 23, 2016 and confirmed that he would support to Remain a 
member of a ‘reformed’ European Union.136 
Brexit transcended normal politics, both from the political baggage that 
came with the issue and from technological developments in political 
campaigning and communication. A train of endorsements lined up behind the 
Remain and Leave campaigns. Rather than being confined to media outlets and 
newspapers, endorsements came to encompass corporations, businesses, 
academia, international figures, and so on. Populism fed into this, enabling Nigel 
Farage, Boris Johnson, and similar political figures to condemn alarmist 
endorsements on the Remain, establishment-oriented side as ‘Project Fear,’ a 
term borrowed from the Yes Scotland campaign from the failed 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum. Regardless of their characterizations, Brexit was 
definitively a precarious exercise of democracy. Equally, Brexit is not as simple 
as supporting a certain political party or politician, it is inherently kaleidoscopic.  
By the time of the referendum in 2016, radical change in how an individual 
interacted with politics on a daily basis reflected the multivariate, complexity of 
Brexit politics. The social media phenomenon, not just in politics but in larger 
socio-cultural situations, significantly alters the cognitive perceptions of its users. 
Social media allows the individual to perceive that they have a complete grasp 
over politics, when it is merely a façade orchestrated by user bias or the 
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‘Algorithm.’ In the sphere of social media, politics happens instantaneously 
between its users and never, ever ceases. Traditional media outlets are weighed 
down in that they are limited by program scheduling in the case of television, or a 
writer has to construct an article, and have it published in the case of 
newspapers. Thus, social media can be easily manipulated by politically-oriented 
actors and operatives to disseminate information (or misinformation) to the users. 
United Kingdom membership in the EU can be deemed as the mother of 
all questions in postwar European politics, perhaps surpassing German 
reunification. It is unlikely that one referendum would be able to grasp this loaded 
question, but that is precisely how the campaign was conducted on all sides. The 
campaign focused scrupulously on the why but left the how virtually unknown 
until after the referendum. Hyperdemocracy explains that the intensification of 
democracy is unsustainable – democracy undermines itself. In this respect, a 
single question in one referendum is not able to fulfill its intended democratic 
objective. The narrow 52-48 (Leave to Remain) result of the referendum is for all 
intents and purposes split right down the middle; neither side could honestly say 
that they had decisively won. Not only is this the case, but it is unclear if it is 
politically possible for a government that officially supported Remain to support 
the Leave result of the referendum in good faith. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trajectory of the European Union is about as open-ended as the 
project itself. As long as the political core of France and Germany remains 
committed to the project, as they did in the immediate years after World War II, it 
is apparent that the EU will continue to be a powerful force in Europe for decades 
to come. Decades of progress shown by various treaties and cooperative 
endeavors have bound the continent in theory; thus, in this respect, it would take 
an equal or greater amount of time to unwind the project in the same, slow, 
peaceful, and diplomatic manner. The symbolic renewal of ties in 2019 between 
France and Germany, led respectively by President Emmanuel Macron and 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, may endure as only a symbolic gesture. President 
Macron, a self-styled pro-Europe centrist, is deeply unpopular with the French 
people, who only elected him to office in 2017 to prevent an even less-palatable 
Le Pen presidency. It is not out of the realm of possibilities that he will join his 
predecessors Sarkozy and Hollande as a one-term President.  Chancellor 
Merkel, who has maintained standing for being the most powerful politician in 
Europe for more than a decade, announced that she would leave German politics 
at the end of her term in 2021. It is unclear if she will leave all politics or accept a 
high-level position in the EU. Nevertheless, her departure and Macron’s low 
approval ratings (coupled with the Gilets Jaunes protests in France), leaves more 
questions than answers on who will definitively lead Europe into the 2020s. 
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Economics played a key role in exposing underlying variations between 
EU member states. While the Greek economy has significantly improved since 
the lowest point of their depression, unemployment has not returned to pre-2008 
levels. Many Greeks have given up on politics or left the country, and the Greek 
government still holds a mountain of debt. The far-left government led by 
SYRIZA, while campaigning in 2015 on an anti-austerity platform, has largely 
broken its campaign assurances to show restraint in accepting loans backed by 
austerity measures. It is easy to participate in the ‘what-if’ game with Greece, but 
it is troubling to imagine what would occur if the global economy stalled with 
circumstances similar to 2008. Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis also created 
conditions that have allowed so-called cryptocurrencies to flourish in use as 
skepticism toward national banks and currencies intensifies. Growth in e-
commerce and economic globalization have rendered physical iterations of 
currencies less relevant, which threatens some of the optimism that the creators 
of the Euro had in trying to craft a European identity through a monetary union. 
The Euro is a continual reminder of European cooperation and European 
citizenship but has the corresponding ability to cultivate resentment toward 
ambiguous European institutions when the economy is not doing well. 
Putin’s strategy in the Ukraine has been a success, far surpassing the 
geopolitical advances originally made in Georgia. Russian-backed separatists in 
the Donbas alone has created enough ambiguity related to Ukraine’s sovereignty 
that NATO accession carries more risk than before. Perhaps the largest 
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disadvantage for Ukraine is the loss of control over the Crimean Peninsula, which 
now functions as Russia’s guaranteed dominance over the Black Sea. 
Additionally, Putin’s multifaceted Special War has taken on new frontiers. 
Russian-backed exploitation of largely unregulated Internet-based and social 
media platforms has assisted in manipulating political discourse and intensifying 
the politics of Western liberal democracies. While foreign interference in elections 
is recognized by most observers and politicians to be problematic, evidence of 
how effective online propaganda and misinformation is in actually altering voting 
intentions of the electorate in the overall, complex political discourse remains 
inconclusive. 
Populists will continue to remain prominent in European politics and alter 
political landscapes. Some observers toward the end of 2016 suggested that 
populism was a passing phase; that soon Europe would be able to return back to 
relative political stability seen in the early 2000s. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Look no further than the course that Brexit has taken in the United 
Kingdom since 2016. Brexit has inarguably defined the second half of the 2010s, 
possibly even the whole decade. The United Kingdom was poised to officially 
leave the European Union on March 29, 2019 in compliance with the provisions 
in the now-famous initiation of Article 50. However, this did not happen. Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s successor Theresa May negotiated a withdrawal 
agreement with the EU but catastrophically failed in securing a majority that 
would see its approval. Thus, the United Kingdom was not able to leave on time. 
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Also problematic was Prime Minster May’s minority Conservative government 
elected in a 2017 snap election that not just included hardliners within her own 
party, but the Eurosceptic, British Unionist, and Northern Ireland based 
Democratic Unionist Party. The specific issue that ostensibly killed the withdrawal 
agreement upon its disclosure in late 2018 was related to the so-called Irish 
backstop, a provision that would keep Northern Ireland within the EU Customs 
Union if a solution was not made to avoid a hard border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. Eurosceptics within the Conservatives in addition to the whole 
DUP delegation, predictably did not accept May’s agreement. In many respects, 
the weak negotiating position held by Cameron before the referendum has 
intensified under May. In order to avoid a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, an extension (two of 
them, at this point in time) was made to Article 50 to October 2019. May’s failure 
to deliver any Brexit, a key 2017 campaign promise that explicitly mentioned the 
March 2019 deadline, effectively wiped out support for her Conservative 
government and has miraculously resurrected the political life of Nigel Farage 
under his new ‘Brexit Party.’ A scenario that the March 2019 deadline was 
supposed to prevent, the United Kingdom is likely to participate in European 
elections in May 2019, with Farage’s tightly-run, single-issue Brexit Party 
receiving high levels of support from disillusioned Brexit supporters. 
The complications related to Brexit underscores the complexion of the 
greater political zeitgeist in contemporary European politics. When traditional 
politics is unable to solve a particular crisis, the sole act of keeping power from 
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radicals and populists by desperately governing from the political center 
inadvertently disillusions more of the populace to turn to alternatives. This 
strategy, in general terms, has been the playbook of the so-called ‘political 
establishment’ in recent years. May’s withdrawal agreement demonstrates the 
politically lethal act of trying to please everyone, but eventually pleasing no one. 
The challenge for the EU and its members in the years forward will be the 
navigation of the shifting political paradigm driven by political alternatives. Brexit 
negotiations under May has confirmed that this strategy does not work. 
Ultimately, the long-term political health of the EU, and indeed the whole of the 
Western world, will rest upon this very issue of balancing between solving 
popular grievances without jeopardizing the foundations of liberal democracy.
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